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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The U.S. Army in 1940 was in the early stages of developing an airborne 
capability to exploit the vertical envelopment concept.  That concept became reality in 
1942 with the first airborne operation in North Africa.  Although the first parachute drop 
contributed virtually nothing to the overall success of the mission, it was the beginning of 
an important capability.   
 In 1943, the War Department authorized five airborne divisions despite a lack of 
experience and doctrine to direct the new organizational structure.  The airborne 
initiative expanded much more quickly than did the doctrine, training, or employment 
principles.  The first attempts of conducting large-scale airborne operations in combat 
during the Sicilian Campaign that year proved to be disastrous.  Because of these 
failures, the airborne division, as well as the vertical envelopment concept itself, were in 
jeopardy.  Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall appointed a special board to 
investigate the causes of the disasters and make recommendations as to the soundness 
of the airborne division. 
While the board was meeting, half-way around the world in the South West 
Pacific Area, a successful airborne operation occurred when the 503d Parachute Infantry 
Regiment executed a drop at the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip that allowed the 
capture of the essential port of Lae, New Guinea.  This operation had a broader impact 
than just the tactical objectives that it achieved.  This was the first unqualified successful 
American airborne operation of World War II and it allowed the airborne advocates to 
make a case for the soundness of the vertical envelopment concept, as well as that of 
the airborne division.  Had it not been for this parachute drop, the U.S. Army might have 
abandoned the whole initiative just when it was planning to employ two airborne 
divisions during Operation NEPTUNE, the airborne portion of Operation OVERLORD.   
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"War undergoes a constant evolution.  New weapons create new forms of 
combat.  To foresee this technical evolution accurately, to assess the effect 
of a new weapon system on the course of a battle and to employ it before 
the enemy does, are essential conditions of success." 1 
 
-- Official German Manual on Troop Leadership 
 (Truppenführung) prior to World War II 
 
 On October 17, 1918, Colonel Billy Mitchell went to see General John J.  
Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, with a plan to put 12,000 
soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division into light bombers and drop them by parachute 
behind German lines.  Pershing was skeptical about the plan, but surprised Mitchell with 
tentative approval to determine its feasibility.  However, the operation did not happen 
because the war ended less than a month later.  The plan died, but the idea did not.  The 
strategy intrigued one of General Pershing's staff officers, then Colonel George C. 
Marshall.  Over twenty years later, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff, revived the 
airborne concept and made it a reality.2   
The United States was not the pioneer in vertical envelopment; on the contrary, it 
was years behind several other countries.  Although the United States was the last major 
power to develop the airborne concept, it possessed the largest and most advanced 
airborne forces by the end of World War II.  This development did not always come easily, 
or without its share of disasters through a series of trials and errors.   
By 1942, an infantry battalion had been the largest unit involved in an airborne 
operation.  The War Department activated parachute and glider infantry regiments faster 
than the Air Corps could produce aircraft or pilots to train with, or transport, the airborne 
forces.  This issue of troop carrier availability and training continued to plague the airborne 
effort throughout the war. 
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In 1942, the War Department expanded the airborne concept to include divisions 
in spite of the lack of doctrine and troop carrier units.  The decision to activate airborne 
divisions came after Brigadier General William C. Lee visited England in July 1942 to 
observe British airborne training.  The most significant item Lee brought back was the 
news that the British were going to form airborne divisions.  When he briefed Lieutenant 
General Leslie J. McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, on the results of his trip, 
he recommended that the United States form an airborne division of its own to have the 
capability to conduct large-scale offensive combat operations.3  McNair had his staff study 
the proposal and less than two weeks later he advised Lee that the War Department was 
going to form not one, but two such divisions.  As a result, on August 15, 1942, the 82d 
and 101st Infantry Divisions at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana became the 82d and 101st 
Airborne Divisions.4   
The parachute infantry regiment was the largest airborne formation addressed in 
any doctrinal manual when the War Department activated the first two airborne divisions.  
There was still much to learn about the doctrine, training and employment principles of a 
parachute regiment -- let alone an airborne division.  Many of the lessons learned about 
large-scale airborne operations came from the units already assigned to the war-time 
theaters while they were training or conducting combat operations.  In most cases, the 
lessons learned were from poor performances. 
By the middle of 1943, the series of airborne failures in the European Theater 
caused many of the senior military leaders to question the soundness of the concept, or at 
least the idea of an airborne division.  Fortunately for the advocates of vertical 
envelopment, the South West Pacific Area produced a dazzling display of a perfectly 
planned and executed large-scale airborne operation.  On September 5, 1943, the 503d 
Parachute Infantry Regiment’s operation at the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip allowed 
the capture of the essential port of Lae, New Guinea.  This first unqualified successful 
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American parachute drop of World War II allowed the airborne advocates to make a case 
for the soundness of the airborne concept, as well as that of the airborne division.   
It is interesting to note that this operation occurred in the Pacific Theater, where 
there was only one parachute infantry regiment.  At the time of the operation, General 
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, had 
slightly less than two percent of the total U.S. Army and Air Corps, which amounted to 
only 10 percent of the total forces deployed outside the continental Unites States.  His 
share of the Navy forces was even smaller than that of the Army forces.5  Because 
MacArthur and his staff understood that they represented the secondary front and 
therefore did not receive the same resources as the main effort, what they did receive, 
they employed effectively and efficiently. 
 
4 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIRBORNE 
 
"Where is the prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its 
defenses as that 10,000 men descending from the clouds might not in many 
places do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought 
together to repel them." 
 
-- Benjamin Franklin, 1784 
After witnessing one of the first manned balloon flights 
 
 
 The development of the airborne concept went quickly from an idea into reality.  In 
fifteen months the project went from a staff study to an actual parachute drop and just 
over two years later a combat jump.  Despite the speed of the initiative, there were many 
obstacles, challenges, and failures.   Some of the obstacles were the training and 
organizational structure of the initial units.  The challenges included doctrine, training, and 
employment principles.  The failures came in North Africa and Sicily.  The disastrous 
results of the Sicilian operations in July 1943 clearly showed the poor training of the troop 
carrier units and the lack of coordination and planning among all forces involved.  Many of 
the senior leaders in the Army were excited about the possibilities of vertical envelopment, 
but not all were convinced of its practicality.   The unsuccessful operations in Sicily almost 
led to the demise of the concept.       
In May 1939, Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall directed his 
Chief of Infantry to conduct a staff study of the concept of parachute and air-landing 
infantry units.  This directive was in response to the many intelligence briefings Marshall 
had received about the European powers that were experimenting with, or already had 
formed, various parachute and air-land units.  Marshall saw the enormous advantages in 
conducting a surprise vertical envelopment of the enemy by the use of airborne forces.1  
Airborne forces consisted of three types:  parachute, glider, and air-land, or troops that 
landed by air transport. 
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Five days after Marshall’s request, Major General George Lynch, Chief of Infantry, 
delivered an extensive report on tests and operations that the Army already had 
conducted on the movement of forces by air.  Pointing to the capabilities and training of 
other nation's airborne units, he recommended employment principles and called for 
immediate experimentation to determine several key characteristics: the appropriate 
organizational structure and size, types of weapons and equipment, place in the Army’s 
organizational chart for command and control purposes, and design and characteristics 
for troop carrier airplanes.  His final recommendation was that he immediately receive a 
squadron of nine airplanes to begin testing at Fort Benning.2 
Several months passed before General Marshall acted on the recommendations.  
The extreme shortage of transport airplanes, as well as the long list of projects associated 
with equipping a rapidly expanding army, put the airborne project at the bottom of a long 
list.  Marshall eventually sent the recommendations to his Chief of the Air Corps, Major 
General Henry "Hap" Arnold, asking him for comments and recommendations.  Arnold, in 
turn, sent the project to his Air Corps Board at Maxwell Field and his Plans Division in 
Washington for their recommendations.3  
Arnold received two divergent views on the airborne project.  Colonel Walter 
Weaver, Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School, wholeheartedly advocated the 
formation of parachute units within the Air Corps to perform functions similar to those the 
Marines Corps executed for the Navy.  The paratroopers would guard airdromes and 
supply centers, conduct military ceremonies, provide guards for prisoners, as well as 
serve as parachute troops.  Lieutenant Colonel Carl "Tooey" Spatz, author of the Plans 
Division study, argued that the already meager resources of the Air Corps and the 
shortage of transport aircraft would not allow another priority project.  At the time the Army 
had just over a hundred aircraft to support its requirements.  He suggested that the project 
be the subject of joint study of the Air Corps and Infantry Boards until more aircraft were 
available.  Arnold endorsed Spatz's recommendation and sent it forward to Marshall.  
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Impressed by the coordinated employment of tanks and attack airplanes by German 
forces in Poland that September, Marshall agreed to keep the concept under study.  For 
the moment, he did not want to detract from the Air Corps' mission of developing a strong 
attack air arm.  The project languished until December 1939 when the Red Army’s 
employment of paratroopers in its attack on Finland revived Marshall’s interest.  Although 
the Soviets failed to achieve any immediate tactical victory, the possibilities were 
intriguing.  The Chief of Infantry appointed then Major William C. Lee to head the airborne 
project.4 
Over the next several months Lee made considerable progress in the development 
of airborne techniques and procedures.  To his surprise, he received strong support from 
the Air Corps.  Throughout the spring, Lee test-dropped at Lawson Airfield on Fort 
Benning weighted containers that replicated paratroopers to determine proper jump 
altitudes and the resulting ground dispersion patterns.   
In May 1940, German airborne troops spearheaded the attacks on Holland and 
Belgium with great success.  In the attack against Holland, they captured essential 
bridges across the Maas and Waal Rivers, allowing the Panzer units to advance across 
Holland unhindered.  In Belgium, both glider and airborne forces landed inside the fortress 
of Fort Eben-Emeal, neutralizing that critical installation along the King Albert Canal 
defensive line.  The successful exercise in vertical envelopment energized Lee and his 
assistants and attracted widespread attention within the Army.  The reason was two-fold -- 
it was not only the accomplishment of such vital tasks with a small number of forces, but 
also the impact those missions had on the ultimate outcome of the overall operations.  
The German achievement provided a concrete example of the capabilities and the value 
of airborne forces and magnified the urgency of the airborne project.5   
Major Lee informed the Infantry Board in June 1940, that he was ready for live-
jump tests and that all he needed was volunteers.  They came from the 29th Infantry 
Regiment at Fort Benning to form the Airborne Test Platoon.  The new unit, under the 
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command of Lieutenant William T. Ryder and Lee’s direction, began intensive training the 
next month.  By August 16 it was ready for its first jump.6   The interest of the high-
command was so intense that both Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Marshall were 
on hand to watch the fifth and final qualifying jump.  The operation was an astounding 
success and Marshall immediately authorized the activation of the first parachute 
battalion, the 501st.7   
The training of jump volunteers grew at a furious pace.  In order to keep up with 
the growth of the airborne concept, the War Department activated the Provisional 
Parachute Group on March 10, 1941 at Fort Benning under the command of now 
Lieutenant Colonel Lee.  Still under the direction of the Chief of Infantry, Lee’s mission 
was to conduct basic parachute jump training.  The unofficial mission of the Group was 
also to train cadres for parachute battalions as the War Department authorized them, 
study permanent tables of organization and basic allowances, develop tactical doctrine, 
and prepare training literature.8 
The task almost immediately became an even broader one when the Germans 
employed glider forces and air-landed forces to seize the entire island of Crete in a short 
period.  Before this operation, American planners had placed all their emphasis on the 
development of parachute units, but they now expanded the airborne concept to include 
glider and air-landed troops.9 
As the War Department authorized more parachute battalions, it became evident 
that the airborne effort had progressed to a stage where the Chief of Infantry could no 
longer exercise effective control over it.  He did not have the authority to provide the unity 
of command necessary for organizing, equipping, training and providing effective liaison 
with the Air Corps.  An example of this inefficient organization came when the War 
Department authorized the testing of an airborne combat team that included a field 
artillery battery.  The Chief of Field Artillery first organized the unit and then the Chief of 
Infantry was responsible for its parachute training.  This training occurred only after the 
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howitzers came from the Chief of Ordnance.10  The existing command structure thus did 
not facilitate the growth of the airborne concept.  
Under the Provisional Parachute Group, parachute organizations received only 
individual jump and basic unit training.  They then passed to the War Department General 
Headquarters' control for advanced unit instruction and preparation for combat.  However, 
after basic unit training, the organization was only partially prepared for airborne 
operations.  Further training in the form of battalion and regimental jumps, loading and 
unloading of supplies, and air transport with other units (field artillery, infantry and 
antitank) was necessary.   
Lee pushed for the activation of a unified command to supervise the advanced and 
combined training for all units until they deployed to the theaters of operations.  Without 
this centralized training headquarters, there was no way to ensure uniformity of doctrine, 
procedures and standards throughout the entire airborne community.  With the probable 
dispersal of these units throughout the United States and overseas, the uniform training 
would be nearly impossible.  Another factor was the shortage of transport planes.  Only 
with a centralized location could a single command manage the acute shortage of aircraft.   
The training experiences of 1941 emphasized the critical role the Air Corps played 
in basic, unit and combined training stages.  The Air Corps did not have enough transport 
planes or pilots and staffs to keep up with the requirements of the expanding airborne 
forces.  In June 1941, it could provide only twelve transport aircraft for the 50th Transport 
Wing for airborne training.  This wing was the only such organization in existence; it could 
carry only one infantry company at a time and did not expect to receive any more aircraft 
until 1942.  The need for transport capability became so great in 1941 that the Provisional 
Parachute Group requested in vain the release of the airplane used by General 
Headquarters.11    
The combat mission, rather than a logistical or transport one, governed the 
production of aircraft and the training of pilots and aircrews.  The U.S. Army was fortunate 
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that the civilian Air Transport Association (ATA), the trade organization for the major 
airlines in the United States, had an operational blueprint for their mobilization in case of a 
national emergency.  The president of the ATA was Egar Gorrell, a veteran of the U.S. Air 
Service in World War I.12  The DC-3 airliner easily adapted to a military logistics and troop-
carrier aircraft.  The Air Corps received the first DC-3 (designated C-47) in September 
1941 and owned over 500 by the next summer.13   
The lack of effective coordination between the Air Corps and airborne forces was 
due primarily to the lack of an accurate, long-range schedule of airborne troop transport 
requirements.  There was little coordination among the numerous airborne units 
throughout the country and the Air Corps.  The Air Corps was thus unable to train crews 
properly or acquire sufficient aircraft to meet the requirements of the rapidly expanding 
airborne forces.14  Had there been a centralized training agency for all airborne forces, it 
might have been able to articulate the troop transport needs for the Air Corps.  
The first operational test of the airborne concept occurred in the U.S. Army 
General Headquarters (GHQ) Maneuvers in the fall of 1941.  These maneuvers took place 
in Louisiana in September 1941 and the Carolinas in November 1941.  The 502d 
Parachute Battalion conducted four separate airborne operations, usually company-sized 
because of the shortage of transport planes.  None of the operations was of sufficient 
scale to have much of an impact on the maneuvers and the results seemed to indicate 
that parachute troops were most useful in small-scale sabotage missions.  Although they 
did not provide a realistic tactical test of the capabilities of airborne forces,  General 
McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, believed that the manuevers at least had 
provided good training for the fledgling parachute battalion.15 
The reorganization of the War Department and the U.S. Army in March 1942 into 
co-equal Army Ground Forces (AGF) and Army Air Forces (AAF) paved the way for the 
unified airborne command that Lee envisioned.   The creation of the AGF merged into one 
command the agencies under which the various parachute, glider and air-landed units 
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operated.  The establishment of the AAF provided the one command necessary to 
coordinate with AGF the planning and training for airborne transport requirements.16  
The Army Ground Forces formed the Airborne Command on March 21, 1942 at 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina to provide the oversight for all aspects of airborne operations.  
The Airborne Command replaced the Provisional Parachute Group.  Its mission was to 
organize and train airborne forces, such as parachute, air-land and glider units, control the 
allocation of transport airplanes as made available by the AAF, and determine operating 
procedures for airborne operations.  The Command also had the responsibility for 
development of doctrine and standardization of material and equipment.  This simplified 
the process for advanced and combined unit training and established unity of command to 
insure uniformity of training and procedures.17   
A month after the activation of the Airborne Command, the AAF formed a similar 
organization to deal with many of the troop carrier issues.  This organization was the 
Troop Carrier Command (TCC), later renamed the 1st TCC.18  Its mission was to “organize 
and train Air Transport units for all forms of Air Transport with special emphasis on the 
conduct of operations involving the air movement of airborne infantry, glider troops, and 
parachute troops, and to make such units available to other elements of the Army Air 
Forces to meet specified requirements for Airborne forces.”19 
In Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, published in 
July 1943, the AAF paid little attention to the roles and missions of TCC in airborne 
operations.  That manual was the AAF's "Declaration of Independence," which made the 
case for centralization of all available air power and command through the senior air force 
commander.  The manual declared that "land power and air power are co-equal and 
interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other."20  The only mention of troop 
carriers came in the discussion of the types of tactical aviation.  The manual defined troop 
carrier activities (including gliders) as those air units that carried parachute and airborne 
troops, as well as cargo.  This broad definition made the case for the secondary mission 
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of troop carriers units to deliver supplies when not conducting the primary mission of 
airborne operations.21 
From the point of view of airborne and troop carrier units, the latter should have 
been training for their primary mission -- airborne operations -- when they were not 
actually participating in combat.  The view of most air and ground commanders, however, 
was that airborne training was an uneconomical use of the scarce resource of transport 
aircraft.  Most commanders, especially those of ground armies, regarded resupply as 
more important than training for future airborne operations.  As long as commanders 
regarded such training as non-essential, troop carrier and airborne units did not receive 
the joint training necessary for proficiency.22   
The first task of Airborne Command was to move from the overcrowded Fort 
Benning to Fort Bragg.  On April 9, 1942, the Airborne Command and the two battalions of 
the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment relocated to Fort Bragg.  The next tasks were to 
continue with the training of the newly activated units and writing of doctrine.  The first 
doctrinal publication on airborne operations was Field Manual 31-30, Tactics and 
Techniques of Air-Borne Troops, dated May 20, 1942. 23   Describing airborne warfare as 
the seizure of suitable landing areas by parachute troops and then reinforcement by 
troops arriving by glider or airplane, the manual listed a series of possible operational 
objectives.  Among them were holding key terrain, seizing and holding river and canal 
crossings and defiles, establishing bridgeheads, and capturing or destroying vital enemy 
supply and communication installations.  But the most likely mission was the seizure of an 
airfield and to that task the manual devoted an entire section.24 
The remainder of the manual was a basic description of the organization of a 
parachute infantry regiment, fundamental tactical employment considerations, and advice 
to instructors on how to conduct basic parachute training.  The manual could describe 
only what the Airborne Command expected, since at that point no American airborne 
troops had participated in a combat airborne operation.  Although the document dealt with 
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the basics, much of it proved valid with the test of combat and substantial portions 
remained in later editions and other doctrinal references.25  However, key points of 
doctrine, training, and employment principles would come only through trial and error, a 
sometimes disastrous process. 
The few manuals that did exist in the early development of airborne warfare 
covered only the overall aspects of airborne operations and organizations, not the troop 
carrier operations and organizations.  There were no manuals on the tactics and 
techniques of troop carrier aviation in support of airborne operations.  A basic manual on 
the training of crews and units, operations, navigation aids, and coordination between 
troop carrier and airborne forces was desperately needed.  The available aviation 
manuals treated only air transport tasks that were significantly different from troop carrier 
missions in airborne operations.26   
It did not take many training exercises to reveal the numerous shortcomings in the 
existing doctrine and training manuals.  Basic details were still lacking as late as April 
1943 when a Joint Airborne-Troop Carrier Board made recommendations on minimum 
jump altitudes, jump speeds, formations, time warnings and other jumpmaster-pilot 
coordination issues.27  Some units, such as the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 
which had already departed Fort Bragg for its theater of operation, found answers in its 
own training exercises.  Other units learned the hard way through the trial of combat.      
American airborne troops saw their first action on November 8, 1942, when the 
Second Battalion, 503d PIR (later designated 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion) jumped 
into North Africa as part of Operation TORCH.  This operation was not only the first for 
paratroopers, but it was also the longest of the war. The 39 C-47s that carried them from 
Cornwall, England to North Africa traveled over eight hours and 1,100 miles -- nearly half 
of those being over Spain.28  Most of the troop carriers separated from the formation on 
the long flight.  Several dropped their paratroopers prematurely in Spanish Morocco, while 
others ran out of gas and landed in the desert.   German fighters shot down several more.  
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The remainder dropped their paratroopers nearly thirty-five miles east of the intended 
objective.  The result was that the airborne mission contributed virtually nothing to the 
success of the overall operation.  The fault lay with inept and inexperienced transport 
pilots who had not properly trained for a parachute drop.  There were some valuable 
lessons learned, but after the operation, there was only half the number of parachute 
forces available because of the loss of men and aircraft.29  This failure was just the first of 
more to come. 
By the summer of 1943, the War Department had authorized five airborne 
divisions (11th, 13th, 17th, 82d, and 101st) and several independent parachute regiments.  
There had not been any tests of the large-scale airborne concept, however, to determine 
its feasibility.  The largest organization described in doctrine at the time was the parachute 
infantry regiment.  Any parachute drop larger than battalion-sized was a large-scale 
operation.  The first combat large-scale American airborne maneuvers were regimental 
size operations of the 82d Airborne Division in July 1943 at the island of Sicily.  These 
parachute drops became known as the Airborne’s Baptism of Fire – Operation HUSKY.  
Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the 82d Airborne Division, had serious 
objections.   
 
The Americans, with virtually no night jump training, were to be delivered by pilots 
with the least experience in combat and who were grossly undertrained in night 
formation flying and navigation.  The troop-carrier pilots would have to navigate 
and fly a route over water, at night, that was clearly beyond the capability of most, 
and in the follow-up missions "not suitable" for avoiding friendly naval fire.30 
 
 
The inadequate training of the troop carrier units deeply concerned Ridgway.  He knew 
the mission would be arduous and worried that they had not acquired the necessary 
proficiency to execute the operation as planned.31  In spite of his repeated objections, the 
stage was set for a disaster. 
 There were four separate airborne operations in the Sicilian assault:  HUSKY I, a 
parachute drop about five miles northeast of Gela on July 9;  HUSKY II, another drop 
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three miles east of Gela on July 11;  LADBROKE, a glider mission to a point just south of 
Syracuse on July 9; and FUSTIAN, a parachute mission reinforced by gliderborne artillery, 
five miles south of Cantania on July 13.  The first two operations were American and the 
last two were British.32 
The first American jump was that by Colonel James Gavin's reinforced 505th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment.  The plan was simple enough -- fly to Malta and take a 
dogleg to the left, coming in on Sicily's southwest coast near Gela.  The dogleg was 
necessary to avoid Allied naval convoys and the possibility of their anti-aircraft fire.  The 
troop carrier aircraft flew under 500 feet to avoid radar detection.  The island of Sicily was 
to come into sight on the right side of the aircraft and the paratroopers were to jump on 
four drop zones to the east of Gela.33   
The 226-aircraft formation flew in an aerial column over 100 miles long.  Three 
airplanes missed the turning point over the island of Malta and returned to North Africa.  
There was a thirty-five mile per hour crosswind from west to east that caused the entire air 
armada to make landfall on the eastern coast of Sicily.  Most paratroopers saw land come 
into sight on the left side of the aircraft, instead of the right as planned.  German anti-
aircraft fire shot eight airplanes out of the sky and severely damaged many more.  
Twenty-three airplanes dropped their paratroopers in the British zone near Noto, almost 
sixty miles away from the intended drop zone.  Another 127 placed their paratroopers 
several miles outside of the division's sector.  According to Gavin's estimation, only about 
12 percent of the combat team landed near the correct drop zone, a contingent still widely 
scattered by the strong winds.34  The returning pilots, thinking they had been successful, 
were elated.  In spite of all the navigation problems, most claimed they had found their 
drop zones.  The troop carrier unit proudly informed its higher headquarters that "80% of 
the paratroopers had been dropped on their designated drop zones."35  In reality, almost 
the opposite was true. 
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The paratroopers were unable to secure most of their assigned assault objectives.  
However, this did not stop them from being productive, or destructive in this case.  Small 
groups of lost paratroopers roamed through the hills of southern Sicily cutting telephone 
lines and ambushing enemy patrols.  Other groups caused confusion and fear by just 
appearing here and there.  The scattered paratroopers throughout the area panicked the 
enemy and caused him to exaggerate greatly the Allied strength.  The German 
commanders assumed that the drops had been well executed and that there were 
numerous organized airborne battalions within or behind their front lines.  As Field 
Marshall Albert Kesselring, German Supreme Commander in the Italian Theater later 
commented, the Allied paratroopers had “considerably impeded the advance of the 
Hermann Goering Panzer Division and helped to prevent it from attacking the enemy 
promptly after the landings at Gela and elsewhere.”36  Hitler’s forces thus faced a new 
dimension of warfare.   
It was fortunate that the commander of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division did 
not counterattack with speed and vigor.  If he had, the counterattack on the thinly 
defended beachheads would have been a catastrophe for the poorly prepared Americans.  
The scattered groups of paratroopers bought valuable time for the landing divisions to 
establish a secure beachhead and build combat power.  General George S. Patton 
credited the paratroopers with speeding his ground advance by forty-eight hours.37 
To judge the success or failure of an airborne operation requires consideration of 
three aspects:  the air contribution, the airborne effort, and the impact of the parachute 
drop on the overall outcome.   The Weapon System Evaluation Group (WSEG), which 
conducted a study and evaluation of airborne operations after World War II from the 
standpoint of their utility in future operations, defined a successful air effort as one which 
“a high degree of accuracy and concentration of a large proportion of troops delivered is 
achieved with light troop losses and maximum air destruction and obstruction of the 
movement of enemy material and personnel.”38  As for an airborne effort, it would turn in a 
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“perfect performance if all its objectives were seized and held at the planned time."39  
Success for the overall effort was if the airborne operation “accomplishes its planned 
purpose, and the success of the operation measured in terms of the accomplishment of 
ultimate purpose, was dependent on the performance on the airborne forces."40 
There are relative degrees and combinations of success within these definitions.  
For example, an air effort can be a total success, but the whole effort could be a failure.  
Alternatively, the airborne effort could be a total success, but failed to achieve the purpose 
of the overall effort.  In actual airborne operations, however, the actual results were 
usually combinations of these definitions.  From the perspective of the air effort, the 
HUSKY I airborne operation was a failure, in spite of the reports from the pilots.  The troop 
carriers did not drop the paratroopers accurately, nor were the paratroopers dropped 
closely together.  From the perspective of the airborne effort, the operation was a failure 
as well because the paratroopers were not able to achieve their assault objectives.   For 
the whole effort, the airborne operation was a success.  Although the paratroopers did not 
accomplish their planned purpose, the success of the overall operation was dependent on 
the airborne forces.  The failure of the air effort directly contributed to the failure of the 
airborne effort, but may have indirectly contributed to the overall success of the operation.  
HUSKY I was a success since it facilitated the Seventh Army's advance, but the costs 
were high. 
What the HUSKY I operation revealed again was the serious weaknesses in the 
capabilities of the troop carriers, which could not drop a large force reasonably close to a 
chosen drop zone at night.  In the defense of the pilots, the aircraft flew a circuitous route 
because of naval restrictions, there was insufficient time for reconnaissance and briefings 
by subordinate flight leaders, and the weather was severe that night.  Obviously the troop 
carriers units needed better navigational aids and more training in night flying.41 
 On July 11,1943, General Patton ordered Ridgway to bring in another regimental 
combat team later that night with little or no planning or coordination.  The next unit to 
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jump in HUSKY II was the 504th PIR, commanded by Colonel Reuben H. Tucker, III, who 
lacked one of his battalions.  This mission comprised 144 C-47s that carried the 
paratroopers to an abandoned airfield three miles east of Gela.  The purpose of the 
operation was to reinforce the 505th PIR.  The pilots believed this would be a "milk run" 
and vowed to improve on their previous poor performance.  By all indications, the mission 
started well.  All the airplanes made the turn at Malta and were on course and in 
formation.  The first indication of trouble was that the air armada received random and 
inaccurate fire from some of the Allied convoys while they were approaching Sicily, but 
there were no reported damages.  After all the airplanes made proper landfall and skirted 
along the beachhead at Sicily, they encountered clouds and climbed to 1,000 feet to avoid 
them.42   
Ridgway was at the drop zone waiting for the arrival of the 504th PIR when all of a 
sudden friendly anti-aircraft units opened fire.  Within a minute, it seemed to Ridgway that 
every anti-aircraft weapon afloat and ashore began firing along the entire length of the 
beachhead.  Because of the haste in executing the operation, neither the Allied ships nor 
the units on the beachhead had received sufficient warnings about the airborne operation.  
Friendly fire hit sixty of the 144 airplanes; twenty-three crashed into the sea or on Sicily 
and the anti-aircraft fire damaged thirty-seven beyond immediate repair.  The remainder of 
the airplanes broke formation and dropped paratroopers wherever they could -- some 
inside German lines.  The results were disastrous.  There were 229 paratrooper and 
ninety aircrew casualties.43  There was no question about the execution of HUSKY II:  
from the standpoint of the air, airborne and overall effort, it was an unqualified failure. 
The two British airborne operations proved to be as disastrous as the American.  
The failures of Sicily convinced many military leaders that such operations were too costly 
to be of value.  General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the overall Allied Commander, was one of 
the skeptics.  Eisenhower knew that small groups of paratroopers, although widely 
scattered through no fault of their own, had performed extremely well at many points on 
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the battlefield.  He appointed one of his airborne advisors, Major General Joseph Swing, 
to investigate the reasons for the debacle.  In his subsequent report (see fig. 1), Swing 
listed five major errors for the HUSKY II failure:  insufficient prior planning and lack of 
coordination between the Army, Air and Navy; inability of aircraft to adhere closely to 
routes given;  the unalterable decision of Navy elements to fire at all aircraft at night 
coming within range of their weapons;  the unfortunate circumstance of an enemy 
bombing raid coinciding exactly with the arrival of the friendly aircraft;  negligence of some 
ground commanders in informing their units of the airborne operation.44  In the end, the 
board was unable to find a sole cause or fix any single blame for the disaster and it took 
no disciplinary action.  Ridgway's statement best sums up the whole tragic incident: 
 
The responsibility for the loss of life and material resulting from this operation is so 
divided, so difficult to fix with impartial justice, and so questionable of ultimate 
value to the service because of acrimonious debates which would follow efforts to 
hold responsible persons or services to account, that disciplinary action is of 
doubtful wisdom.  Deplorable as is the loss of life which occurred, I believe that the 
lessons now learned could have been driven home in no other way, and that these 
lessons provided a sound basis for the belief that recurrences can be avoided.45 
 
   
Unfortunately, those lessons came through the inevitable price of war in human life. 
The Fifth Army Airborne Training Center also submitted a report on HUSKY 
airborne operations that was very critical of the troop carrier performance: 
 
The 82d Airborne Division was in superb physical condition, well qualified in the 
use of infantry arms, in combined ground operations, and in individual jumping.  It 
was extremely deficient in its air operations.  The 52d Troop Carrier Wing did not 
cooperate well.  Training was, in general, inadequate.  Combat efficiency for night 
glider operations was practically zero.  The combined force of the 82d Airborne 
Division and troop carrier units was extremely deficient.46 
 
 
The report also commented on the employment of troop carrier units for purposes other 
than airborne operations.  The report stated that higher headquarters did not realize the 
importance of the joint training of troop carrier and parachute units in conducting airborne 
operations.  The troop carrier units were focusing on their secondary mission of resupply 
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Figure 1.  General Swing's Comments on HUSKY II Airborne Operation. 
Source:  Huston, Out of the Blue, p. 273.
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operations to the detriment of their primary mission of airborne operations.  There was not 
enough emphasis on the joint training for airborne operations. 47 
After the Sicily operation, the entire airborne concept was the subject of 
widespread discussion both within and outside the airborne community.  Swing voiced the 
most optimistic opinion.  He believed that the Allied airborne forces could have been a 
decisive factor in the invasion of Sicily if employed differently.  Instead of four separate 
regimental-size operations to support the seaborne invasion, Swing advocated the 
consolidation of the units for a mass attack into the heart of Sicily.48  At the other end of 
the debate was Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commander of AGF, who was far less 
optimistic about the airborne concept.  The failures at Sicily convinced him of the 
impracticality of handling large airborne units, so he recommended that parachute units be 
no larger than battalion-size.49  
Even within the 82d Airborne Division, there were differences of opinion about the 
organization of the airborne division.  At the time, the 82d Airborne Division had two 
parachute infantry regiments and one glider regiment.  The "nonparatroopers," Ridgway 
and Assistant Division Commander Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, believed the 
AAF was not capable of dropping paratroopers at night and was not willing to provide 
adequate fighter escort for daylight operations.  So they concluded that the parachute 
regiments should be withdrawn from the division and be employed by the theater 
commander for special missions of regimental size or smaller.  The airborne division, 
stripped of its parachute regiments, would become, in effect, an air-landed division of 
gliders and transports.50 
The "paratroopers," Gavin and Tucker, wanted to maintain the integrity of the 
airborne division.  But they did make several recommendations for change, such as 
intensified aircrew training, including B-17 bombers in the aerial formations to provide 
navigation and protection, and the employment of pathfinders to mark drop zones.  Their 
argument convinced Ridgway, who presented the case to Eisenhower.   Ridgway urged 
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that the AAF must intensify training for all types of airborne operations, but especially 
night operations.  Sicily, he continued, had demonstrated that the commitment of airborne 
division in a piecemeal fashion was a mistake.  But to deploy the whole division would 
obviously require more transport aircraft.  A final lesson learned, he concluded, was that a 
single commander of airborne forces capable of choosing routes and enforcing safety 
procedures was required.51   
Following a review of the airborne operations conducted during the Sicily 
campaign, Eisenhower stated in his after-action report to Marshall:  “I do not believe in the 
Airborne Division.  I believe that airborne should be organized in self-contained units 
comprising infantry, artillery and special services, all of about the strength of a regimental 
combat team.”52  He recommended against the airborne concept primarily because a 
division was too difficult to control in combat.  This letter almost resulted in the break-up of 
the five airborne divisions.53 
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CHAPTER 3 
PLANNING FOR CARTWHEEL 
"I accordingly applied my major efforts to the seizure of areas which were 
suitable for airfields and base development, but which were only lightly 
defended by the enemy." 1 
 
-- General MacArthur, in Reminiscences 
 
In 1943, General Douglas MacArthur's primary goal in the Southwest Pacific was 
to cut off the major Japanese naval staging area, airfields and supply bases at Rabaul.  
Located on the northeast coast of the island of New Britain, Rabaul was the Japanese 
focal point for the protection and reinforcement of the entire area.  In order to seize this 
critical target, it was first necessary to capture New Guinea, the strategic right flank of the 
Japanese line of defense.  The gulf port of Lae was the final objective of the New Guinea 
offensive.  In order to employ all necessary forces for the assault, MacArthur needed an 
airfield in the vicinity.      
MacArthur's plan was to "envelope them, incapacitate them, apply the 'hit 'em 
where they ain't -- let them die on the vine' " method of "leap frog" advances.  As he 
explained to one of his staff officers, this was the very opposite of the term "island 
hopping," which was the direct frontal pressure against enemy-occupied islands in a long 
and costly effort.  Instead, he intended to envelop the enemy in order to bypass and 
neutralize Japanese centers of strength.   This maneuver required the careful selection of 
key points, usually lightly defended areas that were suitable for airfields and bases, as 
objectives.  The timing of their seizure was critical for success.2 
The lack of aircraft carriers and naval aviation significantly hampered MacArthur's 
progress in the Southwest Pacific.  The very nature of "leap frogging" depended on 
achieving air superiority over each move forward.  The limit of advance in the Southwest 
Pacific was the maximum range of ground-based fighter aircraft.  The presence of aircraft 
carriers would have enabled MacArthur to strike quickly and decisively throughout the 
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entire area of operations, but reliance on ground-based aircraft meant that he had to 
advance airbases to support each subsequent operation.3 
The senior intelligence officer of the Japanese Eighth Area Army described 
MacArthur's successful strategy to secure Buna, Papua: 
 
This was the type of strategy that we hated most.  The Americans, with minimum 
losses, attacked and seized a relatively weak area, constructed airfields and then 
proceeded to cut the supply lines to troops in that area.  Without engaging in a 
large-scale operation, our strongpoints were gradually starved out.  The Japanese 
preferred direct assault after the German fashion, but the Americans flowed into 
our weaker points and submerged us, just as water seeks the weakest entry to 
sink a ship.  We respected this type of strategy for its brilliance because it gained 
the most while losing the least.4 
 
 
This strategy worked to capture Buna, so MacArthur planned to use it again to take 
Rabaul. 
With the fall of Papua in January 1943, the Japanese consolidated their defensive 
positions.  They withdrew along the northern coast of New Guinea, New Britain and the 
northern Solomons.  New Guinea was the strategic right flank of the Japanese line of 
defense.  From New Guinea, the Allies were able to begin operations into the heart of the 
Japanese-occupied areas, and eventually assault the Philippines and Japan itself.   
Final planning for the Rabaul operations began after the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued their planning directive on March 28, 1943.   The directive ordered General 
MacArthur and Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the South Pacific Area 
(SOPAC), to accomplish the following tasks:  establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina 
Islands; seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area of New Guinea; occupy 
western New Britain; seize and occupy the Solomon Islands as far as southern 
Bougainville.5  MacArthur commanded the entire operation, but the advances in the 
Solomons were under the direction of Admiral Halsey (see fig. 2).  SOPAC was one of the 
three subordinate commands of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Area.  Except 
for the forces designated for the Rabaul operations, Halsey remained under Nimitz’s 
control.  This arrangement was another one of the complicated chain of commands in the 
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Fig 2.  The Pacific Theater Area of Operations and Commands. 
Source:  Morton, Strategy and Command:  The First Two Years. 
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Pacific Theater.  Fortunately for the Rabaul operation, the violation of the principle of unity 
of command did not affect the outcome.6 
The planning task to seize Rabaul was not difficult because MacArthur's 
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) General Headquarters (GHQ) had already developed two 
previous plans (designated ELKTON) to accomplish this mission.  On April 26, 1943, 
SWPA GHQ issued its plan, codenamed ELKTON III, after a personal conference in 
Brisbaine between Halsey and MacArthur.  The joint operations of the SWPA and SOPAC 
would occur under the codename CARTWHEEL (see fig. 3).  The plan, calling for mutually 
supporting advances along two axes of SWPA and SOPAC forces, envisioned thirteen 
amphibious operations, over eight months, culminating in the capture of Rabaul.7    
The SWPA and SOPAC plans each had three phases.  The SWPA phases were I, 
II and III and the SOPAC phases were A, B and C (see figs. 4 and 5).  The initial two 
phases (Operation I and A) began simultaneously.  Operation I was the seizure of 
Woodlark and Kiriwina and Operation A was the ground operations in the Solomon 
Islands (New Georgia and Santa Isabel).  Operation II was the capture of Lae (IIa), 
Salamaua and Finschhafen (IIb), and Madang (IIc).  One month later, the SWPA would 
begin Operation B to complete the conquest of New Georgia and move forward to take 
the Japanese bases on the Shortland Islands and Buin in southern Bouganville.   The final 
set of operations would also begin simultaneously.  Operation III would cross the Vitiaz 
Strait to seize Cape Gloucester and Operation C would take control of Buka Island before 
converging on the final objective of Rabaul.8 
MacArthur used mainly the existing headquarters in his command to execute 
ELKTON III (see fig. 6).  But he did set up, under the direct control of his GHQ, a new, 
primarily American, task force (Alamo), under the command of Lieutenant General Walter 
Krueger.  The Alamo force was virtually the same as the Sixth Army that Krueger 
commanded.  The remainder of the ground forces, primarily Australian, was the New 
Guinea Force, under the control of Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey.  The Alamo  
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Fig 3.  The CARTWHEEL Area of Operations. 
Source:  Miller, CARTWHEEL:  The Reduction of Rabaul. 
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Fig 4.  SOPAC CARTWHEEL Operation A, B and C. 
Source:  Miller, CARTWHEEL:  The Reduction of Rabaul. 
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Fig 5.  SWPA CARTWHEEL Operation I, II and III. 
Source:  Miller, CARTWHEEL:  The Reduction of Rabaul. 
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Fig 6.  Organization of Forces for CARTWHEEL. 
Source:  Miller, CARTWHEEL:  The Reduction of Rabaul. 
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Force conducted operations in Woodlark, Kiriwina and New Britain while the New Guinea 
Force fought primarily in New Guinea.  Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, 
commander of the U.S. Fifth Air Force, was responsible for the Allied Air Forces.9  
The CARTWHEEL operations began June 29, 1943 when Halsey invaded New 
Georgia (Operation A) and MacArthur struck at Nassau Bay (Operation I).  The following 
day two U.S. Army regiments, 112th Cavalry and 158th Infantry, from the Alamo Force, 
made unopposed landings at Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands.  Nassau Bay, about forty 
miles from Lae, became a staging area that threatened the Japanese at Salamaua, a 
village that guarded the overland approach to Lae.  As the 41st Division and 162nd 
Regiment pushed slowly along the coast of the Nassau Bay, the Japanese began to 
reinforce Salamaua with the troops from the Lae garrison.  These operations set the 
conditions for a flanking attack by sea and air at Lae.   While the Americans advanced 
along the coast of Nassau Bay, Australian troops crossed overland from Wau through the 
Owen Stanley Mountains.  An Allied pincer closed on the real objective of Lae.10 
 MacArthur described the basic scheme of maneuver for the New Guinea Force to 
seize the Huon Peninsula. 
 
My plan to advance in northeast New Guinea and to seize the Huon Peninsula 
was entrusted to what was called the New Guinea Force.  It was largely composed 
of Australian troops under the command of General Blamey.  My order to the 
Force was to seize and occupy the sector that contained Salamaua, Lae, 
Finschhafen, and Madang.  Lae was to be the first main objective -- its capture 
would breach the vital gate in the Huon Peninsula.  The advance pushed the 
enemy back toward Salamaua with the purpose of deceiving him into the belief 
that it, and not Lae, was the prime objective.11 
 
 
In early June 1943, Kenney began to look for airfields that could cover both an airborne 
and an amphibious assault on Lae.   General Whitehead, the Deputy Fifth Air Force 
Commander, established a base that was sixty miles southwest of Lae at a native village 
named Marilinan.  There was an old airstrip at the location, but it was satisfactory only for 
cargo planes.  Just four miles to the north was another strip at a little village named Tsili-
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Tsili that was made into a double runway 7,000 feet long with ample room for dispersed 
parking areas.12 
 Work began immediately under great security to improve the airfields.   The Fifth 
Air Force brought in jeeps and trailers to move supplies from Marilinan to Tsili-Tsili for the 
larger base there.  Two and one-half ton trucks were necessary to handle the supplies, 
but would not fit into the C-47.  The ingenuity of the airmen of the Firth Air Force then 
came into play:  they sawed the frames of the truck in two, put the pieces in separate 
planes, flew them over the Owen Stanley Mountains into Marilinan, where they bolted and 
welded the trucks back together.  On July 26 the first fighters landed at Tsili-Tsili without 
the Japanese even detecting the improvements to the airstrip.  In the middle of August, 
the airfields were ready and fighters based there could now concentrate on the Japanese 
barge traffic into Lae from Wewak and Rabaul and the airfields at Wewak.13 
 In the middle of July, the successful continuous attacks of the Allied Air Forces 
under Kenny and the SOPAC attacks near New Georgia took the initiative away from the 
Japanese air force in both the SWPA and SOPAC areas.  By August, the plans to capture 
Lae were in their final stages.  In spite of the progress, Kenney reported to MacArthur that 
he did not have sufficient assets to destroy all the Japanese air forces at both Rabaul and 
Wewak.  So he gained approval to concentrate all his forces on Wewak -- the airfield that 
had the greatest impact on the Lae operation.14 
 With the forward secret airbase at Tsili-Tsili complete and in full operation, the 
fighters were in effective range of Wewak and were able to provide the required escort for 
the heavy bombers.  On August 17, Kenney's airmen struck Wewak and destroyed a 
hundred Japanese airplanes on the taxiways.  He had planned the raid based on 
intelligence from compromised air-ground codes that revealed that the Japanese had 
concentrated ten regiments of airplanes at Wewak.  The destroyed aircraft were most 
likely about to take off to attack Tsili-Tsili and Marilinan.  A Japanese reconnaissance 
flight had discovered the new bases on August 14 and over the next two days the 
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Japanese attempted to attack the bases with little success.15  The Fifth Air Force 
continued the attack and destroyed twenty-eight more aircraft.  In just two days, the 
Japanese Fourth Air Force had lost three-quarters of its aircraft and was unable to oppose 
Allied operations at Lae.16  The conditions were set for the coordinated airborne and 
amphibious attack on Lae. 
 MacArthur's plans to seize the Huon Peninsula and the Markham Valley were 
complex.  Lae was the first objective.  There were enough troops in the New Guinea 
Force, but the terrain precluded large-scale overland movements.  The SWPA lacked 
enough ships for a completely amphibious assault and did not have enough aircraft for a 
complete air-movement of the required troops.  To employ all the necessary forces, 
MacArthur and his staff developed a plan to employ all available means -- a division 
amphibious assault, an assault by parachute forces, and an air-movement of an entire 
division.17 
 Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring, 1st Australian Corps Commander, 
controlled the assault on Lae.  For this operation, he had two divisions – Major General 
George Vasey's 7th Australian and Major General Sir George Wooten's 9th Australian.  The 
original plan called for the 9th to land by sea to the east of Lae and the 7th was to march 
overland from the Wau-Bulolo area down the Markham Valley towards Lae from the west.  
In addition to the two Australian divisions, MacArthur made available a parachute battalion 
from the 503d PIR that formed part of Krueger's Alamo Force.  The battalion’s mission 
would be to seize the airfield at Nadzab.  During the assault on Lae, Major General 
Edward J. Milford's 5th Australian Division would continue to press towards Salamaua, to 
draw enemy forces away from the Lae area  (see fig. 7).  At the planning conference, 
Admiral Barbey worked with Wooten to prepare for the amphibious assault and Whitehead 
worked with Vasey to plan the attack on Nadzab and the subsequent air resupply of the 
7th Australian Division.18   
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Fig 7.  New Guinea Force Operations. 
Source:  Griess, Atlas of the Second World War:  Asia and the Pacific, p. 21. 
 
 Vasey was not happy with the original plan, which relied heavily on using the 
uncompleted Bulldog-Wau road to move his division into the Bulolo Valley.  Once in the 
Markham Valley, the division would require another road to advance into the Lae area.  
Any delay would allow the Japanese to build up their forces.  In addition, the long overland 
march would exhaust his unit.  Vasey returned to the New Guinea Force Headquarters 
later that afternoon to recommend to Herring that the majority of his forces fly into Nadzab 
and receive resupplies by air.19   
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 Vasey was also unsatisfied with the plan for one parachute battalion to seize the 
airstrip against possible opposition, while also preparing the airstrip for the transport 
planes to bring in the 7th Australian Division.  Enemy movement down the Markham Valley 
was increasing and it was essential to seize the airstrip quickly.  Although the Japanese 
did not occupy it, patrols passed through the area on a regular basis.  On July 31, Vasey 
discussed with Colonel Kenneth H. Kinsler, Commander of the 503d PIR, the possibility of 
using the entire regiment for the assault.  Kinsler "jumped" at the chance.  On August 2, 
Vasey wrote to Herring requesting the use of the entire 503d PIR in the operation.  Since it 
was a theater asset, the approval of MacArthur's GHQ was necessary; that obtained, 
planning for the operation continued.20 
 There was another plan developed that called for an Australian infantry brigade to 
fly into Tsili-Tsili several days before the operations at Nadzab and then move down the 
Watut River to the Markham River to be in position to support the airborne operation and 
seizure of the airstrip at Nadzab.  As the planning continued, Vasey reduced the force to 
just the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/6th Field Company.  After the 503d PIR seized 
the airstrip, the pioneers and engineers would prepare the airstrip for the 7th Australian 
Division's air-movement.21 
 The timing of the attacks to seize Lae was critical.  To ensure minimal resistance, 
there also had to be a deception plan to divert Japanese attention from Lae.  Kenney 
proposed that the Navy load native boats and repaired Japanese barges with dummy 
figures to look as though they had troops on board and tow them from Goodenough Island 
in the direction of Gasmata on New Britain.  His fighters would allow the Japanese 
reconnaissance planes to report to Rabaul the naval expedition moving towards Gasmata.   
He would then mass his fighters for the Japanese attack that he expected as soon as they 
received the report.  The idea did not materialize because the Navy could not spare the 
resources.22   
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Salamaua was the deception plan for Lae.  Still in control of Salamaua, the 
Japanese believed that the Allied preparations were part of the plan to strengthen the 
forces advancing on Salamaua.  With enemy attention on Salamaua, the 9th Australian 
Division would make a surprise landing east of Lae on September 4 and draw the 
Japanese attention in that direction.  On the following day, the 503d PIR would make an 
unopposed jump to the west of Lae at Nadzab.  That would allow the 7th Australian 
Division to air-land the following day and commence its movement east towards Lae.  
There would then be a race between the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to see which unit 
could first make it to Lae.23  Rumor had it that Vasey and Wooten had a bet of twenty 
cases of whiskey on the outcome.24 
On August 15, Blamey and his Chief of Staff flew to New Guinea to take command 
of the operations and to complete the plans.25   The New Guinea Force prepared the final 
tactical plans in conjunction with MacArthur's GHQ as well as with the Allied Air and Naval 
Force Staffs.  On August 24, MacArthur and Kenney arrived at Port Moresby.26  The 
whole plan was complete, except for one detail -- the start date.  The original D-Day was 
August 1, but it was postponed to August 27 to allow enough C-47s to assemble for the 
airborne and follow-on air-land operations.  Kenney did not have enough transport aircraft 
to ensure Allied success.  With enough planes available at the end of August, MacArthur 
left the final decision for the start date to Kenney – and the weather.  Kenney wanted early 
morning fog over western New Britain and the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits west of the Huon 
Peninsula, while the Markham Valley remained clear to allow the airborne operation at 
Nadzab.  This was a common condition for the area, but the weather forecasters could not 
agree on a date.  Kenney told MacArthur that he would give him the date and time to start 
the operation on September 1.27  On the morning of September 1, Kenney's Australian 
and American weather teams kept changing their forecasts and could not agree on a date.  
The Australian team finally said the 3rd would be the best date, while the American team 
said the 5th.  Kenney decided that they knew little about weather forecasts, so he split the 
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difference and told MacArthur the best date for the amphibious assault would be the 
morning of the 4th.28   With the date set, the New Guinea Force made final preparations for 
the attack on Lae. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LONG ROAD TO PORT MORESBY 
 
"Hey, we ain't heading toward New York!  We're in Tennessee -- that's my 
pappy's farm out there!" 
 
-- Unknown 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment Paratrooper 
 
 
In October 1942, the War Department ordered the 503d Parachute Infantry 
Regiment (PIR), still without a third battalion, to the Pacific Theater.  Even before this long 
trip across the Pacific Ocean, the regiment had a lengthy journey and numerous name 
changes before their departure for Australia.  The unit formed at Fort Benning, but went to 
Fort Bragg with the movement of the Airborne Command.  It was here that the regiment 
formed and trained before receiving orders to deploy to the Southwest Pacific.  In route to 
Australia the regiment picked up its third battalion in Panama.  Once in Australia, the unit 
conducted numerous training exercises and airborne operations in preparation for 
employment.  This order came in August 1943.   The final leg of the journey was to Port 
Moresby where the regiment prepared for the first jump in the Pacific Theater.     
On August 22, 1941, the War Department activated the 503d Parachute Battalion 
under the command of Major Robert Sink, a member of the 501st Parachute Battalion. 1  
This first such battalion formed in September 1940 from the original Test Platoon after the 
fifth and final qualifying jump before a prestigious audience.  The two most notable 
personnel present were Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Chief of Staff General 
George C. Marshall.  Fortunately for the airborne concept, the Test Platoon made a 
favorable impression on both of them that they did not quickly forget.   The members of 
the Test Platoon formed the cadre of the 501st Parachute Battalion and many later 
became members of the 503d PIR when the 501st Parachute Battalion became the 
Second Battalion, 503d PIR in November 1942.2  
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On October 5 the War Department activated the next parachute battalion, the 
504th, under the command of Major Richard Chase, who was also a member of the 501st 
and previously an executive officer of the 503d.  Just after the new battalion completed 
basic airborne training, it and the 503d moved to Fort Bragg because of the formation of 
the Airborne Command as well as the crowded conditions at Fort Benning.  On March 2, 
1941, with the peacetime restrictions for army troop strengths lifted, the War Department 
ordered the formation of four parachute regiments from the existing parachute battalions.  
The 503d and 504th now formed the 503d PIR, the 503rd constituting its First Battalion and 
the 504th Second.  The first commander of the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel William 
M. Miley.3   
On May 20, less than three months after the regiment formed, the War Department 
ordered Miley to provide a parachute battalion for duty in Europe.  He released the 
Second Battalion (originally the 504th Parachute Battalion), which was later renamed the 
509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and gained the distinction of being the first American 
unit to jump in combat during Operation TORCH in North Africa.4  With the departure of 
Second Battalion for Europe, the 503d PIR had only one remaining battalion at Fort Bragg.  
On June 4, the War Department activated the Third Battalion of the 503d PIR.  Just before 
the Second Battalion departed for Europe, Miley had reassigned the executive officer, 
Major John J. Tolson III, to organize the new battalion, which drew its paratroopers from 
the cadre of the 502d Parachute Battalion who were still at Fort Benning.   The 
Headquarters Company of the 502d became the Headquarters of Third Battalion, 503d 
PIR.  Companies A, B and C of the 502d Parachute Battalion became Company G, H and 
I, Third Battalion, 503d PIR respectively.5   
That October the War Department secretly ordered the 503d PIR to the Pacific 
Theater.  On October 10, the 503d PIR completed loading all the men and equipment on 
trains under Tolson’s supervision.  Kinsler temporarily transferred Tolson to the job of 
regimental executive officer and made him acting commander of the regiment for the 
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move when Kinsler himself departed early for Australia to prepare for the unit's arrival.6  
The very afternoon the paratroopers loaded the trains, Ridgway, commander of the 82d 
Airborne Division, delivered the final unit before the regiment departed Fort Bragg.   
Company A of the newly activated 504th PIR was the newest addition to 503d PIR.7  
Ridgway made a point to tell Tolson to pass a message to Kinsler:  although it was 
customary for a unit to give up its worst unit when ordered to transfer one, that was not 
the case with this transfer.  Ridgway assured Tolson that this was the best rifle company 
in the division.  Ridgway also said that he knew that it was typical for a commander to 
remove the officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the newly transferred unit and 
replace them with those he knew.  He told Tolson that he would keep an eye on Company 
A and that it had better not happen.8
The First Battalion had undergone extensive ski training in the snowcapped 
mountains of Utah, so the paratroopers believed they were heading for combat in a frigid 
climate, possibly somewhere in Scandinavia.   They expected to board ships in New York 
bound for England, following the Second Battalion that had left in June.  Little did they 
know they were heading for the jungles in the Southwest Pacific.  It was not until the next 
morning when a paratrooper staring out of the train window watching empty cornfields roll 
by did they realize they were not going to New York.  "Hey, we ain't heading toward New 
York!,”  the paratrooper yelled out. “We're in Tennessee -- that's my pappy's farm out 
there!"9
The train trip across the United States lasted just over a week.  The 503d PIR 
finally arrived at Camp Stonemen, near Pittsburg, California, where it conducted more 
preparations for overseas movement such as equipment inspections and vaccinations.  At 
dawn on October 20, the 503d PIR aboard the Dutch freighter, the SS Poelau Laut, 
passed under the Golden Gate Bridge and out of the San Francisco harbor.  Twelve days 
later it arrived at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, where the 501st Parachute Battalion, less 
its Company C, came aboard.  Company C remained behind to form a cadre of the 551st 
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Parachute Battalion, activated in November 1942. The senior person on board was now 
Lieutenant Colonel Jones, commander of the 501st Parachute Battalion.10  
Company A and B, 501st Parachute Battalion became Company E and F, 503d PIR 
respectively and Company A, 504th Parachute Battalion became Company D, 503d PIR.  
These unit redesignations formed Second Battalion, the newest battalion of the 503d PIR, 
now a full regiment -- at least on the books.  Each unit knew in its heart that it was 
superior to the others.  Although distrust, jealousy and suspicion were common, the 
regiment formed into a cohesive fighting unit in spite of being a collection of individual 
units thrown together.11   
On December 2, after forty-two days at sea, the 503d PIR docked at Cairns, North 
Queensland, Australia and established an encampment site about two miles southwest of 
Gordonville on the northeast corner of Australia.   Gordonville was due south of New 
Guinea, just across the Coral Sea from the Port Moresby area.  The 503d PIR began an 
extensive eight-month training period.  During this time, Kinsler was the regimental 
commander, Jones was the executive officer, Lawrie commanded the First Battalion, 
Major John Haltom commanded the Second Battalion and Tolson commanded the Third 
Battalion.12  By the time the regiment moved to Port Moresby in August 1943, Haltom had 
returned to the United States with a severe case of malaria and Jones again had taken 
command of Second Battalion.  Lawrie replaced Jones as executive officer and Lieutenant 
Colonel John Britten assumed command of First Battalion.13   
The 503d PIR was the target of considerable attention during its time in Australia.  
Among some of the visitors were MacArthur, Blamey, and Krueger.  All were very 
interested in the watching the regiment conduct airborne operations.  There were 
numerous jumps between the training exercises and exhibitions for the visiting dignitaries.  
One jump per month was mandatory to stay on status for jump pay at the time was $50 for 
enlisted men and $100 for officers.  Many of the paratroopers suspected that the extra 
money was necessary to induce the officers to jump out of an airplane.14   
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From April through July, there was an intensified training period for airborne 
operations at Cairns.  The peak of this training was in May when records showed that 
8,167 paratroopers had jumped during 572 training hours flown by the Fifth Air Force.15  
Each paratrooper averaged about five jumps a month since there were approximately 
1,700 paratroopers in the regiment at the time.  The training and experience the 
paratroopers gained working together with the Fifth Air Force's troop carriers later proved 
invaluable – not only to the 503d PIR, but also for the Fifth Air Force's troop carrier units. 
On July 24, the 503d PIR received a warning order from MacArthur's GHQ alerting 
one battalion for possible combat operations.  Immediately upon receipt of the order, 
Kinsler and several members of his staff proceeded to Port Moresby to confer with the 
commanding generals of Fifth Air Force and 7th Australian Division.  Although the exact 
date of the upcoming operation was unknown, all units began to prepare tentative plans.  
For this operation, the 503d PIR was under the operational control of the 7th Australian 
Division for securing the Nadzab airstrip to allow the division to air-land.  Kinsler and 
Vasey discussed the operation at great length.  Because of the terrain and the extensive 
front the unit was to cover, they secured MacArthur’s approval to employ the entire 
regiment.  On July 30, Kinsler and his staff returned to Gordonvale and began preparing 
for the movement to Port Moresby. 16
Vasey and his 7th Australian Division had just completed the Buna Campaign and 
dealt with many of the problems associated with air movement and resupply.  Without this 
experience, Vasey doubted that the time available while they were at Port Moresby would 
have been sufficient to prepare for the upcoming operation.  Whitehead, Deputy Fifth Air 
Force Commander, and Vasey developed a good working relationship and worked closely 
together on a detailed plan.  This was the first Allied operation of its kind and was very 
complex with the combination of amphibious, parachute and air-land assaults.17   
The Fifth Air Force formed two separate planning staffs to control the fighter and 
transport units for the operation.  Whitehead took a personal interest in the planning for 
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the parachute and follow-on air-land assault.  He ensured that the 7th Australian Division 
had five C-47s available for the infantry brigades to practice loading and unloading.   On 
August 7, 1943, he also arranged one of several low-level reconnaissance flights over 
Nadzab so that Vasey and members of the 503d PIR could personally view the area of the 
intended assault.18  
Because of the inquisitive nature of the paratrooper and tendency for rumors to 
spread about upcoming missions, Kinsler wanted to keep the mission secret, from both 
the Japanese and his paratroopers.  Therefore, he announced that the 503d PIR would 
move to New Guinea to participate in a large airborne training maneuver with the 32nd 
Infantry Division.  The cover story did not fool the paratroopers.  When the alert came for 
the move to New Guinea, it only confirmed their suspicions that their long-awaited first 
mission was not far off.19
On August 7, MacArthur's GHQ issued the orders for the 503d PIR to proceed to 
New Guinea in preparation for combat operations.  On August 15, an advance party flew 
to Port Moresby and the following day the Second Battalion flew in as well.  The 
remainder of the 503d PIR sailed from Cairns on August 20 on the liberty ship SS 
Duntroon and reached Port Moresby harbor two days later.20  Nearly two years after the 
503d Parachute Battalion made its final qualifying jump, it was about to make its first jump 
in combat. 
43 
CHAPTER 5 
THE NADZAB AIRBORNE OPERATION 
"Gentlemen, that was as fine an example of discipline and training as I 
have ever witnessed."1 
 
-- General MacArthur, September 5, 1943 
 
 
Success of the 7th Australian Division's attack on the port city of Lae depended on 
the possession of the airstrip at Nadzab to allow the division to air-land.  Before the war, 
transport and small passenger aircraft used the airstrip for emergency landings.  Just to 
the south on the Markham River was the Gabmatzung Mission, run by the German 
Lutherans.  From Gabmatzung, the Markham Road ran twenty-five miles southeast to the 
port city of Lae, New Guinea.  Nadzab was important not only for the airstrip, but also its 
location along the Markham River Valley to the west of the Huon Peninsula.  The 
Markham and Ramu Rivers were the two major waterways on the island of New Guinea.  
The Markham ran southeast to the Huon Gulf at Lae, and the Ramu ran northwest to the 
Hansa Bay between Wewak and Madang.  These two rivers formed a valley that 
separated the Huon Peninsula from the remainder of New Guinea.  The valley made an 
easy passage to the Japanese bases of Wewak and Madang along the northern coast of 
New Guinea (see figs. 5 and 7).  Capturing this key terrain at Nadzab would block that 
valley route, while possession of the airstrip would give the Fifth Air Force another forward 
base to support its air campaign against Rabaul and Wewak.2 
On August 24, both MacArthur and Kenney arrived at Port Moresby to be present 
for the final stages of the planning and for the execution of the operation.  Several days 
after MacArthur's arrival, he surprised Vasey with a trip to his headquarters.  The two 
seemed to get along well together and agreed on the concept and details of the operation.  
Their only disagreement was over Japanese troop strength at Lae.  Vasey placed the 
number at close to 5,000, while Herring's staff put it at nearly 7,000.  MacArthur thought it 
was much smaller, around 1,400.  While the actual strength was about 2,000, MacArthur 
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had the advantage of having information gained through signal intelligence available to 
only the very senior commanders.3   
The 7th Australian Division published its operations order on August 27.  The intent 
of the operation was to secure Nadzab in order to conduct offensive operations against 
Lae and to prevent the Japanese from sending reinforcements up the Markham Valley.4   
The tasks given to the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment were as follows: 
 
(a) Capture area Nadzab - Gabmatsung - Gabsonkek on Z-Day -- object covering 
preparation of a landing strip. 
(b) Establish road block across Markham Valley Rd. in area of junc. Rd and track 
445546 -- object preventing enemy movement into Nadzab along this road. 
(c) Prepare landing strip on site of present Nadzab emergency landing field with 
utmost speed.5 
 
 
MacArthur had not established the date for the operation when the 7th Australian Division 
published its order.  The final date did not come until September 1 when Kenney made his 
recommendation to MacArthur based on the weather forecasts.  Z-Day was one day after 
the 9th Australian Division's amphibious assault to the east of Lae. 
On August 29, one week before the operation, Kinsler assembled his three 
battalion commanders and staff at his regimental headquarters to brief them on the 
mission to drop on, seize and hold the abandoned airstrip at Nadzab.  They would link-up 
with Australian engineers who would upgrade the strip to permit the landing of the 7th 
Australian Division.  The division would then attack Lae from the west while the 503d PIR 
continued to secure the Nadzab airstrip.6 
Kinsler assigned Britten the task of jumping his First Battalion directly onto the 
airstrip and clearing it of all enemy troops, although the intelligence reports indicated that 
there were very few in the area.  In addition, the battalion was responsible for starting the 
preparation of the airstrip until relieved by the Australian engineers.  Next Kinsler directed 
Jones to jump his Second Battalion north of the airstrip to secure Gabsonkek and provide 
flank protection for First Battalion.  Last, he assigned Tolson's Third Battalion to jump east 
of the airstrip and the secure the village of Gabmatzung.  This was the enemy's most 
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likely avenue of approach if the Japanese opposed the landing from the garrison at Lae.  
This was not likely, however, because the Japanese units at Lae would have their hands 
full defending against the 9th Australian Division attacking them from the east.7 
The 503d PIR did not have any attached or organic artillery.  To make up for the 
shortage of firepower, MacArthur's headquarters provided two "cut-down" twenty-five 
pound artillery sections with thirty-one personnel from the Australian 2/4th Field Regiment.  
The only problem was that the Australian gunners had never seen parachutes.  Lieutenant 
Robert W. Armstrong, from First Battalion, had the responsibility of training the volunteers 
in the basic skills of jumping from an aircraft.  The gunners also learned how to 
disassemble the artillery pieces and pack them in separate containers, each attached to 
the other with webbing (known as the ground control pattern) in order to facilitate recovery 
and expedite assembly on the ground.  This was essentially the same procedure used for 
dropping the American 75mm pack howitzer.8  
On August 30, the gunners made their one and only practice jump with one of their 
guns under the watchful eyes of Vasey and their regimental commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel Alan Blyth.  It was such a success, that they earned the right to go in with the 
503d PIR on its first combat jump.  The Aussies were not actually going to jump with the 
regiment, but they would do so one hour after the initial airborne operation.  Four 
airplanes arrived at Port Moresby on September 4 to transport the Australian gunners and 
"baby 25 pounders."  They loaded their guns and flew the same day to Tsili-Tsili in 
preparation for the next day's jump.9  
Kinsler, his three battalion commanders, and several regimental staff officers 
made a reconnaissance flight over the jump area in a B-17 on August 30.  This flight 
proved valuable because they were able to view the proposed jump areas, check points 
and surrounding areas.  Even more importantly, they were able to determine the 
prevailing winds near the jump areas.  The meteorological reports stated that winds in the 
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Markham Valley were unusual:  they blew down the valley until 1100 hours daily and then 
suddenly changed and blew up the valley.  This proved to be exactly the case.10 
On September 1, Kinsler met with all the company commanders in the regiment.  
He gave them an overview of the upcoming mission, but wanted it kept a secret from the 
paratroopers.  The men may have not have known the details, but they saw the officers 
coming and going to secret meetings as well as the continuous arrival of C-47s, so they 
knew something important was about to happen.  Meanwhile, they conducted intense 
rehearsals and training for the upcoming mission, attending classes on Japanese 
weapons, friendly aircraft identification, demolitions methods, and land navigation.11  Of 
course, there were also the occasional visitors who wanted to see the 503d PIR.  Vasey 
showed up to address the regiment and tell the paratroopers how proud he was to have 
them with him.  They were struck by the bitter way he referred to "Dirty Little Nips" in his 
"kill them all" speech.12  Another visitor was MacArthur, who arrived with his corps of 
photographers and had his picture taken with many members of the regiment.13 
The Fifth Air Force airmen also conducted extensive preparations before the 
operation for their part.  The 54th Troop Carrier Wing, under the command of Colonel Paul 
H. Prentiss, was responsible for airlifting the men to the target.  After much planning and 
preparation between the Fifth Air Force and the 503d PIR staffs, they decided to use a 
formation of six planes staggered to the right with thirty seconds between elements in 
order to reduce chance of mid-air collisions while maximizing the widths of the drop 
zones.14   
General Kenney was concerned about the vulnerability of the troop carrier convoy 
along the route to Nadzab, so he and Whitehead developed a very intricate air support 
plan for the operation.  The Fifth Fighter Command was responsible for furnishing fighter 
protection along the way, as well as smoke and air support before, during and after the 
parachute operation.  The air plan had 100 fighter aircraft to protect the slow-moving and 
bunched up transports.  The air plan also had six squadrons of B-25s to strafe and bomb 
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the jump areas before the airborne operation.  Just after the B-25s, six A-20s would lay 
smoke across the jump areas to screen the descending paratroopers.  Kenney did not 
want to leave anything to chance.15 
The Fifth Air Force practiced the entire mission for three straight days starting on 
September 2.  The pilots were veterans and knew all the details of the three major jump 
areas -- one for each battalion.  Emphasis during rehearsals was on formation flying to 
ensure that the entire 503d PIR landed accurately and together so that it could quickly 
assemble and seize its assault objectives.  The Fifth even conducted a full-scale trial run 
over Rorona, an abandoned airstrip thirty miles up the coast from Port Moresby.  The 
fighter protection fired before the troop carriers loaded with the entire 503d PIR flew over 
the abandoned airstrip and some of the paratroopers jumped to check the timing.  The 
staffs corrected a few minor details and everyone felt much more comfortable about the 
mission.16 
On September 3, Kinsler and the 503d PIR staff issued Field Order 1.  The four 
page base order described the plan for the two-phase operation.  The first phase was for 
the regiment to jump on six separate drop zones in order to seize the emergency landing 
strip at Nadzab (see fig. 8).  In addition, the regiment would secure the surrounding areas 
to deny any enemy infiltration (see fig. 9).  The second phase was to receive the 7th 
Australian Division beginning the following day (see fig. 10).17    
The order contained no changes from Kinsler’s briefing to his battalion 
commanders on August 29 or his company commanders on September 1, but simply 
added many details.  First Battalion had the task of jumping onto Field “B” to capture and 
begin preparing the Nadzab Emergency Landing Strip until relieved.  Second Battalion’s 
mission was to jump on Field "A" to capture the Gabonek area and deny enemy infiltration 
from the north and northwest.  Meanwhile, Third Battalion was to jump onto Field “C” to 
capture the Gabmatzung area and deny enemy infiltration from the east.  The Regimental 
Headquarters Company would assemble with First Battalion and prepare the drop zone  
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Figure 8.  Nadzab Jump Fields. 
Source:  Field Order #1, Annex 2. 
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Figure 9.  Operational Graphics, Phase I. 
Source:  Field Order #1, Annex 3. 
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Figure 10.  Operational Graphics, Phase II. 
Source:  Field Order #1, Annex 6. 
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for the Australian artillery battery.  Regimental Service Company would also assemble 
with First Battalion and gather and distribute equipment and supplies.18 
 The regiment spent the remainder of the day completing battalion orders and 
conducting rehearsals, as well as preparing the company orders.  The battalion 
commanders had the officers around their sand tables one company at a time going over 
their missions.  It was not until September 4, the day before the jump, that company 
commanders assembled their men and spelled out in detail their missions.   All day long, a 
platoon at a time gathered at the regimental sand table where each soldier received a 
briefing on his mission.  The jumpmasters held the last meeting that night.  The leaders 
reviewed the whole mission and updated everyone on the latest changes.19 
 While the 503d PIR made its final preparations on September 4, the 9th Australian 
Division landed twenty miles east of Lae against very light opposition.  Several Japanese 
bombers were able to get through and attack the congested beaches.  The bombers were 
able to damage two ships and kill more than one hundred Australian and American 
seamen.  All through the night, as the members of the 503d PIR tried to sleep, the 9th 
Australian Division continued to march on Lae.20 
 Reveille was at 0300 hours on Sunday, September 5.  The paratroopers rapidly 
assembled in their battalion areas and nervously ate the usual soggy pancakes covered 
with syrup.  As they loaded on the eighty-two trucks in the regimental area, the weather 
suddenly turned and fog completely enveloped the departure airfield.  To make matters 
worse, a light rain began.  It did not look like a good day for a jump.21  The movement to 
the two airstrips, Ward and Jackson, went like clockwork.  Each truck, numbered from one 
to eighty-two, corresponded to the same numbered aircraft lined up on the field.  The 
trucks were in three serials – one for each battalion.  The first serial moved to the 
enplaning point and the other two followed at thirty-minute intervals.  Each truck, with 
twenty-two personnel and supply bundles, proceeded to the airplane marked with its 
corresponding number.22  
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 At about 0730 hours, the rain suddenly stopped and the fog rapidly dissipated.  A 
weather plane surveying the saddle of the Owen Stanley Mountain range gave an all-clear 
signal.  The aircrews of the C-47s began warming up their engines and the paratroopers 
started putting on their parachutes and equipment.  At 0825, the first C-47 rolled down the 
runway.  Within fifteen minutes, three flights of C-47s with the entire 503d PIR were in the 
air on its way to Nadzab.  The formation started for the jump areas led by MacArthur in a 
B-17.23 
 Several days before the operation, Kenney had discussed with MacArthur the 
details for covering and supporting the Nadzab operation.  Kenney casually mentioned 
that he would be in one of the bombers during the airborne operation to see how things 
were going.  MacArthur said that he did not think that Kenney should go.  Kenney 
responded with a series of reasons why he should go, concluding with "they were my kids 
and I was going to see them do their stuff."  MacArthur reflected a moment.  "You're right, 
George, we'll both go,” he said.  “They're my kids, too."24  
 Kenney arranged for the "brass hat" flight of three B-17s to fly just above and to 
one side of the troop carriers as they went into Nadzab.  In the first plane was MacArthur, 
in the second was Kenney and Vasey rode in the third.  MacArthur's only concern was 
that his stomach might get upset when they hit the rough air going over the mountains. He 
did not want to "get sick and disgrace himself in front of the kids."25 
 The armada of over 300 aircraft climbed to 9,000 feet to cross over the saddle of 
Owen Stanley Mountains.  The temperature dipped, but not for long.  The formation 
dropped to 3,500 feet as it approached the secret airfield at Marilinan.  The armada 
rearranged the flight into three columns, each six airplanes wide.  Thirty minutes out from 
the jump areas, the crew chiefs and the jumpmasters started opening the jump doors.  
Aboard one of the airplanes, the sudden rush of wind caused the door to come loose from 
its hinges and become lodged, blocking the exit – and aborting the mission for the 
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frustrated paratroopers on board.  This was the only airplane that had a problem and was 
not able to drop its contingent.26 
 At the junction of the Watut and Markham Rivers, the troop carriers made a right 
turn for Nadzab and dropped to an altitude of 400 feet.  The weather then became very 
hot and humid at the low altitude.  The maneuvers of the airplanes and the bumpiness of 
the flight began to produce some airsickness and paratroopers commenced to fill the 
"honey buckets."  By the time they reached Nadzab, they were anxious for the green 
light.27    
 At 1009 hours, the red lights came on and the paratroopers began to stand and 
make final preparations for the airborne operation while the bombing and strafing began at 
the jump fields.  Six squadrons of B-25 strafers flew at 1,000 feet; each had eight .50-
caliber machine guns in the nose and sixty fragmentation bombs in each bomb bay.  
Immediately behind them were the six A-20s that laid smoke across the jump areas as the 
last fragmentation bombs exploded.  At 1022 hours, the green lights came on across the 
C-47s.  The jumpmasters pushed the door bundles out of the airplanes, then they went 
out right behind the bundles with twenty-one jumpers in rapid succession.  In four and a 
half minutes, the entire regiment was on its way to the ground.  The pilot's of 54th Troop 
Carrier Wing, for the first time in the war, dropped a regiment of paratroopers with pinpoint 
accuracy on its assigned jump areas.28   
 Above the drop, MacArthur watched the operation, thrilled at the sight of the 
parachutes clustered neatly on the jump areas.  After landing back at Port Moresby, 
Kenney recalled MacArthur’s jumping up and down like a kid.  "Gentlemen, that was as 
fine an example of discipline and training as I have ever witnessed,"29 the supreme 
commander exclaimed.  Reflecting later on the operation, he took keen pride in the 
precision drops.   "One plane after another poured out its stream of dropping men over the 
target field.  Everything went like clockwork . . . . [T]he vertical envelopment became a 
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reality,"30 he wrote of that day.  To his astonishment, he received the Air Medal for having 
“personally led” the paratroopers and “skillfully directed” the operation.31 
 Kenney sent a letter to the Chief of the Army Air Force General H. H. Arnold 
describing the operation and his pride in his airmen (see Appendix A).   He also thought 
that everything had gone smoothly until he landed and talked with the pilot of MacArthur's 
B-17.  What Kenney did not know was that during the operation an engine had failed on 
Colonel Roger Ramey's B-17, and that Ramey had recommended turning around. 
MacArthur, knowing that Kenney would follow him back to Port Moresby, refused.  
MacArthur insisted that he wanted to stay and see the show.  The dead engine was on the 
far side of Kenney's bomber, so he did not know until after they had landed and Ramey 
told him of the incident.32 
 The airborne operation went extremely well, but not without tragic incident.  Three 
paratroopers died during the airborne operation, two falling to their deaths when their 
parachutes malfunctioned and another landing atop a very tall teakwood tree and then 
falling some sixty feet to the ground.  In addition to the three deaths, there were thirty-
three minor injuries caused by rough landings.33 
 A small glitch also occurred with the jump by paratroopers of Third Battalion.  The 
first person to make the jump at Nadzab was its commander, the 26-year-old Colonel 
Tolson, who thus became the first American paratrooper to jump in a combat operation in 
the Pacific.  His battalion, leading the regiment into Nadzab, had the mission of jumping 
on Field "C" and blocking the enemy on the east.  As Tolson approached the drop zone, 
he recognized where he was from several reconnaissance flights with the Fifth Air Force's 
bomber runs on Lae.  He watched the red light go off, but then the navigator failed to turn 
on the green light.  Hesitating for a few seconds, Tolson still jumped out and landed in the 
middle of the jump area.  Because of the delay, about half of Third Battalion landed in the 
trees at the eastern end of the drop zone.34     
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 The remainder of the regiment dropped accurately, but the paratroopers on the 
jump areas were no better off than those who landed in the trees.  The razor-sharp kunai 
grass, supposedly only about four feet high, reached up to ten feet high and was thick with 
jungle vines.  The paratroopers, in suffocating heat, hacked their way through with 
machetes and reached their assembly areas exhausted.  That was the only fight for the 
503d PIR -- there was no opposition on the ground.  The paratroopers had caught the 
Japanese totally by surprise.35  Even if the Japanese had been at Nadzab, they probably 
would not have survived the pre-assault fires from the Fifth Air Force.  In Second 
Battalion's area, a worn trail went from the jungle out onto their jump area.  The trail 
across the clearing was a tribute to the Fifth Air Force.  Every ten yards or so there was a 
new bomb crater.36 
 There were also mishaps with the Australians.  Within two hours of the jump, all 
units had assembled, moved to their assigned objectives and begun preparation of the 
landing strip.  Everything went basically according to the plan.  First Battalion seized the 
airstrip, Second Battalion blocked all approaches from the north and Third Battalion 
sealed all approaches from the east.37  One hour after the initial assault, the thirty-one 
Australian gunners, led by their trainer, Lieutenant Armstrong, jumped into Nadzab with 
their two artillery pieces.  The guns, disassembled and packed in padded bundles under 
the wings of the C-47s, dropped like parachute bombs on the drop zone.38  The whole 
group landed in a small area, but took almost three hours to find the ammunition and all 
the pieces to one gun and put it into operation.  It was not until the next day when they 
found all the pieces to the second gun.  The Australian gunners became the first 
parachute artillery in the Pacific.39      
 There was, moreover, a change in plans for resupply.  The original plan called for 
eleven gliders to come in during the afternoon with supplies and equipment, but because 
of the completely unopposed parachute operation, immediate resupply proved 
unnecessary.  Blamey also canceled the glider phase because he had his doubts about 
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the reliability of the gliders and he knew that their pilots had undergone only minimal 
training.  The regiment did not go without resupply, however, because three specially 
configured B-17s loaded with supplies remained over the area during daylight hours for 
the first two days of the operation.  The modified B-17s had a platform in the bomb bay to 
drop parachute supply bundles.40   
To assist the 503d PIR in preparing the airstrip at Nadzab, there were two other 
Australian units -- the 2/6th Field Company and the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion.  The engineers 
and pioneers arrived secretly at the Tsili-Tsili airstrip a week before the operation.  The 
units carefully disguised their mission by occupying the surrounding jungle where the 
Aussies assembled their equipment and began preparations for movement to Nadzab.  
Tsili-Tsili was near the swift, but barely navigable Watut River that ran northeast into the 
Markham River about twenty-five miles upstream from Nadzab.41  The engineers from 
2/6th Field Company had the task of moving down the Watut and then down the Markham 
River to Nadzab on twelve large collapsible boats with all their heavy gear necessary for 
preparing the airstrip at Nadzab.  The task was very dangerous because both of the rivers 
had rapids and constantly changing sandbars.   The engineers planned for a possible 50 
percent casualty rate, in men and equipment, but lost only three boats and one man who 
drowned.  They arrived at their rendezvous point just south of Nadzab early in the morning 
of September 4.42 
The pioneers from 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion had the difficult task of moving sixty 
miles overland with a train of 800 natives.  They crossed mountains and swamps, as well 
as dealt with many of the jungle annoyances such as heat and bees.  On the morning of 
September 5, the pioneers arrived at the south side of the Markham River across from 
Nadzab and linked up with the engineers right on schedule.  The pioneers constructed a 
bridge from the engineer's collapsible boats.  Both units were able to watch the show as 
hundreds of aircraft and many more parachutes filled the skies overhead.  They witnessed 
the greatest aerial caravan ever seen in the Pacific.43 
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 At 1800 hours, the engineers and pioneers linked up with First Battalion and began 
clearing the landing strip, which was 1,500 feet, but overgrown from twelve months of 
inactivity.  Working throughout the night, they extended the runway to 3,300 feet by the 
next morning.  The first C-47 landed at Nadzab at 10:00 AM on September 6 -- less than 
24 hours after the jump.44  By September 11, Prentiss' C-47s had carried in 420 
planeloads of men and equipment from the 7th Australian Division.45   
 The 7th Australian Division pushed down the Markham Valley to attack the 
Japanese at Lae from the west while the 9th Australian Division pressed the attack from 
the east.  With the growing pressure on Lae, the reinforcements to Salamaua ended.  The 
5th Australian Division and the American 41st Division occupied Salamaua on September 
13.  Three days later, the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions converged on Lae.  Around noon, 
September 16, Vasey sent a radio message to Kenney:  "Only the Fifth Air Force bombers 
are preventing me from entering Lae."46  Vasey and his 7th Australian Division were the 
first to enter Lae and win the bet. 
 Based on MacArthur's guidance, the 503d PIR stayed near Nadzab with a 
defensive mission around the captured airstrip.  Vasey did not employ the 503d PIR in 
offensive operations because MacArthur did not want parachute troops doing what regular 
infantry troops could do.   MacArthur directed that after relief by supporting troops, 
parachute units should be withdrawn to prepare for future operations.  With its mission 
complete on September 17, the 503d PIR began to redeploy to Port Moresby.  By 
September 19, the entire regiment closed back on its base camp.47 
 There were ten thousand Japanese troops in the Lae-Salamaua area before the 
Allied assault.  According to captured Japanese war records, one thousand Japanese 
troops died in the first few days of fighting.  Twenty-five hundred more died in the defense 
of Lae and Salamaua.  The remainder of the Japanese troops withdrew northward along 
dense jungle trails, where another 600 perished from illness and exhaustion.  In a postwar 
interview, the intelligence officer of the Japanese Eight Army defending the Lae-Salamaua 
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area said that the 503d PIR airborne operation at Nadzab had taken place where the 
Japanese had thought the enemy would never attack.  The operation nearly cut in half the 
retreating elements of the Japanese 51st Division.  The seizure of Nadzab cut off the 
escape route through the Markham Valley and forced the remainder of the Japanese to 
withdraw over the more difficult jungle terrain to the north of Lae.48  
 The Allied operation against Lae was a total success.  It was a brilliant 
employment of all available sources of firepower and maneuver.  The coordination of the 
feint against Salamaua, the amphibious assault east of Lae with the airborne drop at 
Nadzab were excellent examples of joint planning and operations.  An additional benefit of 
the Lae offensive was the capture of the Nadzab airstrip, which gave Kenney another 
excellent forward base for attacks further to the west and north.  Nadzab soon became 
one of the largest Fifth Air Force bases in New Guinea.49 
 According to the Weapon System Evaluation Group's definition for success, the 
Nadzab airborne operation was an unqualified one.  The air effort was an astounding 
success because the combination of air support and accurate execution of the jump were 
unprecedented.  The degree of air superiority, a fundamental prerequisite for a successful 
parachute drop, attained was a major factor in determining whether it occurred during 
daylight or hours of darkness.  The Fifth Air Force successes against the Japanese Air 
Force ensured the control of the skies that allowed the operation to occur during daylight 
hours making it the first large-scale American parachute drop conducted during hours of 
light.  The daylight airborne operations also allowed the Fifth Air Force to conduct an 
extensive and accurate preparation of the objective area.  Although there were no 
Japanese in the Nadzab area, few would have survived the intense preparation.  The 
daylight operation also facilitated the accurate drop of the entire regiment, which was the 
most accurate one to date. 
 The definition of success for the airborne effort was to seize all of its objectives 
and held at the planned time.  Again, this was another remarkable success.  Within two 
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hours, the paratroopers secured all their assault objectives and within twenty-four hours, 
the airstrip was operational, all according to the plan.  
 The definition for success for the overall effort was that the airborne operation 
accomplished its planned purpose, and the success of the overall maneuver, measured in 
terms of the accomplishment of ultimate purpose, was dependent on the performance on 
the airborne forces.  Again, the overall effort of the parachute drop was markedly 
successful.  The airborne operation allowed the 7th Australian Division to seize Lae.  Had 
it not been for the 503d PIR, that division would have had to go over the rugged 
mountainous terrain to get to Lae.  This approach would have cost it much in terms of time 
and combat power.  And without the 7th, the 9th Australian Division would not have been 
able to capture Lae single-handedly.  In addition to seizing the Nadzab airstrip, the 503d 
PIR also blocked the Markham Valley from any Japanese reinforcements or escape.   
 The Nadzab airborne operation did not experience many of the failures or poor 
employment principles that plagued earlier parachute drops.  Much of the doctrine for 
large-scale airborne operations had not yet been written, so it is not possible to evaluate 
the operation against doctrine.  In any case, the Nadzab parachute drop was well planned 
and executed.  The principles of mass, utilization as a theater level force, realistic and 
thorough joint rehearsals, and air superiority were all present.  The degree of air 
superiority allowed the mission to take place during daylight hours, which probably 
contributed substantially to the success of the air effort of the airborne operation.  The 
daylight parachute drop allowed a precise placement of paratroopers not possible at night 
that facilitated their quick assembly and seizure of their objectives.  
 The Nadzab parachute drop had a decisive impact on the deliberations of the so-
called Swing Board, the special panel chaired by General Joseph Swing to evaluate the 
airborne operations in Sicily for the Chief of Staff of the Army and recommend changes in 
training, doctrine and employment principles.  Indeed, the results of Nadzab reported to 
Washington and Fort Bragg were welcome news in sharp contrast to the operations in 
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Sicily two months earlier.  Although the doctrine for large-scale airborne operations was 
still in development during 1943, the examples of Sicily and Nadzab provided valuable 
lessons that would shape basic doctrine.  The Sicilian parachute drop showed airborne 
enthusiast how not to conduct such an operation.  Nadzab, on the other hand, was an 
inspiring case study of how vertical envelopment should be executed.   
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF NADZAB 
"Were the questions raised by analysis of airborne maneuvers in this 
country taken into account of in the Sicilian operations?  Is the 
organizational set up such that the lessons of both and of the efficient New 
Guinea operation will be given effective application in prospective 
operations?"1 
 
-- Memorandum by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,  
dated October 2, 1943 
 
 
Major General Joseph Swing worked under the direction of Army Ground Forces 
Commander Lieutenant General Lesley McNair during the investigation that evaluated the 
Sicily airborne operation.  McNair had already made up his mind about the future structure 
and organization of the airborne after the failures in North Africa and Sicily.  These 
shortcomings convinced McNair of the impracticality of deploying large airborne units.  He 
planned to recommend that the War Department abandon airborne divisions and restrict 
parachute units to battalion-size or smaller.  Fortunately for the airborne, Marshall did not 
want to take such a drastic step without a test of the airborne division concept.  He wanted 
to determine if there were ways of changing training and operating procedures to employ 
the airborne division effectively.  He then wanted these principles tested in a giant 
maneuver before abandoning the airborne division concept.  Marshall ordered the 
maneuvers in December 1943.  The results of these maneuvers determined the life or 
death of the airborne division concept.2 
Marshall selected Swing, at the time the commander of the 11th Airborne Division 
at Fort Bragg, because of his position of "airborne advisor" to Eisenhower during the 
planning and execution of the airborne operations in Sicily.  Swing had detailed 
knowledge of the entire operation and could make the most informed recommendations.  
The board members included experienced paratrooper and glider unit commanders, and 
AAF troop carrier unit commanders and staff officers. 3  Marshall could count on Swing, a 
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firm believer in the airborne division, to render a verdict that supported Marshall's own 
favorable views of the airborne concept.  Swing already investigated the airborne 
operations for Eisenhower and published his opinion that the airborne operations could 
have been a decisive factor if employed correctly. To give a report of something other 
than favorable for the airborne division, Swing would have been voting himself out of his 
own job.4  
MacArthur was not the only person interested in the success of the airborne 
concept.  Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson also showed a keen interest in airborne 
operations.  After a conversation with Stimson on October 2, 1943, G. H. Door, special 
assistant to the secretary, wrote down several questions for Marshall’s staff to answer that 
Stimson raised about airborne operations, especially about ground forces and the AAF, 
which focused its efforts on ground support, and not troop transport or airborne 
operations.  Stimson also wanted to make certain that the Army was applying lessons 
learned from the previous operations, particularly the successful Nadzab parachute drop, 
to future training and operation.5   
The questions raised by Stimson went to the very essence of the problems arising 
from airborne operations.  A week earlier, Swing had completed his investigation and 
submitted recommendations that answered many of Stimson's questions and concerns.  
The Swing Board had met during September 1943 at Camp Mackall, North Carolina to 
review both Axis and Allied parachute drops to date.  It studied the organization of the 
airborne division and analyzed the problems encountered by the Army Air Force troop 
carrier units in the North Africa and Sicilian operations.  During its deliberations, the 
Nadzab parachute drop occurred, energizing the board members who favored large-scale 
airborne operations.6  By the end of the month, the board finished its findings and 
submitted its recommendations, which consisted of twelve separate, but interrelated, 
issues of doctrine, training, organization, employment principles, and relationships 
between the Airborne and Troop Carrier Commands (see figs. 11 and 12).7   
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Figure 11. Implementation of Recommendation of Swing Board (part 1) 
Source:  Huston, Out of the Blue, p. 262.
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Figure 12.  Implementation of Recommendation of Swing Board (part 2) 
Source:  Huston, Out of the Blue, p. 263.
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The first four recommendations dealt with the publication of a training circular that defined 
the relationship between the Airborne and Troops Carrier Commands, the former’s 
responsibilities, and the details of airborne operations from planning through execution.  
On October 9, the War Department published this document with only minor changes as 
Training Circular Number 113, Employment of Airborne and Troop Carrier Forces (see 
Appendix B).  The Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the War Department's 
Operations Division all endorsed the document.  The publication of this document, which 
became the “bible” for subsequent airborne operations, and adherence to its principles 
were the most important results of the Swing Board.8 
The purpose of the circular was “to provide, in a single reference, information 
based upon experience gained in recent combat operations concerning the employment 
of airborne and troop carrier forces.”9  Both the Airborne Command and Troop Carrier 
Command had conducted business with each other based on gentlemen's agreement, 
rather than from a unified command structure.  Now their interactions were binding.  The 
only airborne operation that the circular cited by name for proper planning and execution 
was Nadzab.  Indeed, the document emphasized many of the principles present in that 
operation.  It stated that airborne and troop carrier units were theater of operation forces 
and, therefore, the planning and controlling headquarters had the authority to direct the 
necessary coordinated action of all ground, sea and air forces involved.  Without this level 
of authority, the planning headquarters could not ensure its proper coordination.  The 
airborne unit remained under the direct control of the theater commander until it landed in 
the combat area when it passed to the control of the ground commander.  A related 
principle dealt with the missions that airborne units were to conduct once employed.  
Since an airborne unit was especially trained and equipped to accomplish a specific 
mission, it was not to be utilized on missions that could be performed by other forces.  So, 
once it passed to the control of the ground commander, its mission was to remain 
limited.10  
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The next major principle was that the employment of airborne units should land in 
mass, and as rapidly as possible and within as small an area as practicable.  In other 
words, the delivery of airborne units over several days throughout an area of operations 
as had been done in Sicily, had been a mistake.  This principle was one that Eisenhower 
cited to Marshall as a lesson learned from the British participation in the Sicilian airborne 
operations.  “A later operation on the British front brought out the lesson [that] when we 
land airborne troops on hostile territory, we should not do it in successive waves, but 
should do it all at once,” Eisenhower wrote.  “In the first wave, where we had surprise, 
losses were negligible, but in the succeeding waves they were very large.”11  This 
principle drove the requirement to have sufficient aircraft to transport the troops and 
equipment necessary at one time to accomplish the initial mission and maintain surprise.  
The circular also promoted the requirement for additional aircraft to conduct resupply 
operations.12   
It was important for the theater or task force commander, according to the 
document, to have proficient airborne and troop carrier advisors and staffs.  It also 
ensured that there was sufficient time to plan, coordinate and conduct the necessary 
training for the upcoming operation.  This indispensable joint planning and coordination for 
the specific operation covered all the details and possible contingencies, and should 
culminate in a joint rehearsal of the operation under conditions that simulated as nearly as 
possible those of the intended operation.13 
This joint training was crucial because it reinforced many of the standard operating 
procedures necessary between the airborne and troop carrier units.  The more units 
became familiar with each other, the more confident they were in each other's abilities.  
The joint training was imperative because it ensured that the commanders and staffs of 
the airborne and troop carrier units communicated directly with each other throughout the 
planning and execution of the training operations.  This was critical in a cooperative 
command structure.  In planning parachute operations, airborne and troop carrier units 
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encountered numerous problems, but they generally overcame them, especially when the 
units conducted adequate joint training and preparation before an operation.  This 
cooperative relationship resolved issues at the troop carrier - airborne unit level.  Rarely 
was there ever an issue that either commander referred to a higher echelon for 
resolution.14  
Another principle was that an airborne operation was an integral part of the basic 
maneuver plan.  Airborne operations, by their nature, were complex, resource-intensive, 
and difficult to coordinate.  Accordingly, there should not be an airborne operation unless 
the situation indicated that its employment was necessary for the accomplishment of the 
mission of the force as a whole.  In addition, to superimpose an airborne operation on a 
major operation already planned would rarely, if ever, be successful.15 
The one new principle introduced in the training circular was that there should not 
be an airborne operation unless ground or naval forces could support the airborne forces 
within approximately three days.  The only exception was if the airborne forces withdrew 
after its mission was over.  This seemed to rule out the strategic employment of airborne 
troops deep in enemy territory that Marshall and Arnold envisioned.  However, related to 
strategic employment was the introduction of airborne forces as a constant threat.  By 
their nature, airborne forces were a threat that could strike anywhere in theater within 
range of troop transport aircraft.  Through their mere presence in the theater of 
operations, airborne forces caused the enemy to disperse its forces over a wide area in 
order to protect vital installations.16  
The next four recommendations of the Swing Board dealt with several issues: the 
number of troop carrier units necessary to support an airborne division, and how to deal 
with shortages, a schedule of troop carrier unit participation necessary to sustain training 
in the United States, and a recommended number of future troop carrier units necessary 
based on the number of projected airborne units.  The AGF, AAF and Operations Division 
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did not universally accept these recommendations.  There was much disagreement over 
the roles and mission of troop carrier units.17    
Swing defined the primary mission of troop carrier units as combat units to provide 
air transportation for airborne forces into combat and to resupply such forces until 
withdrawn or supplied by other means.  The secondary mission of troop carrier units 
within the theater was emergency supply and evacuation, ferrying of troops and 
equipment, and finally transportation of personnel, supplies and mail.  Swing felt strongly 
that while troop carrier units were not participating in actual combat operations, they 
should be training for them and not diverted to other missions that might prevent their 
proper training.  The War Department did not concur with these narrow definitions 
because it viewed separate troop carrier units for the nearly exclusive use in airborne 
operations as an uneconomical use of airplanes.  It countered with the conclusion that 
troop carrier units could fly in from other theaters as necessary to launch large-scale 
airborne operations.18   
The War Department did follow the recommendation on the schedule of training 
requirements for troop carrier units.  War Department Directive "Joint Training of Airborne 
and Troop Carrier Units," dated October 9, 1943, outlined the joint responsibilities of the 
Commanding Generals of the AAF and AGF.  Some of the items in the directive were the 
essential minimum joint troop carrier - airborne training requirements before units 
departed for combat theaters.  The Commanding General, AGF, was responsible for the 
training of the airborne units, while the Commanding General, AAF, had similar 
responsibility for the troop carrier units.19  
Neither a troop carrier unit nor an airborne unit could receive this minimum 
essential training without joint participation of both the AGF and AAF.  Therefore, it was a 
dual responsibility of the Commanding Generals, AGF and AAF, to require close 
coordination and cooperation, which would be possible only through effective long-range 
training plans and submission of requirements to the War Department sufficiently in 
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advance to ensure coordination.  The initially agreed upon troop carrier - airborne 
requirements were in accordance with the schedule contained in War Department 
memorandum "Schedule of Troop Carrier Units" dated September 24, 1943.20    
The last requirement of the directive was the authorization for direct 
correspondence between the Airborne Command and the I Troop Carrier Command.  The 
directive also encouraged the exchange of liaison officers between the two commands.  
All these efforts were to improve the cooperative basis for airborne unit training and make 
it more of a unified command to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of airborne 
operations.21 
The last four recommendations of the Swing Board had to do with various other 
issues such as the development of navigation aids to assist in finding the drop zone, 
activation of a quartermaster company for each theater having airborne units to assist in 
the receipt, packaging and delivery of all classes of supply by air to ground force units, 
testing of combat aircraft in conjunction with glider operations to determine feasibility, and  
the assignment of a general officer to each theater commander to be an airborne adviser.  
The War Department directed an organizational study and to make recommendations on 
these issues and their feasibility, but based on the guidelines in Training Circular No. 113, 
it did not agree that the theater commander needed an airborne advisor because the 
airborne forces were to remain at the theater level for employment.  Swing attempted 
unsuccessfully to keep a higher headquarters from pulling away the senior leaders from 
their units in order to assist in planning future operations. 22   
Ridgway also gave the Swing Board a number of recommendations based on his 
experiences in Sicily and Italy when he returned to the United States and Swing also 
included them in his findings.  Ridgway believed that the airborne disasters had occurred 
largely because the senior ground commanders (Generals Eisenhower, Alexander, 
Montgomery and Clark) and their airborne advisers (namely Browning -- not Swing) had 
not understood how to employ airborne forces properly.  Swing criticized the piecemeal 
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and haphazard employment of airborne troops because they were available.  This view 
coincided with Marshall's assessment that, in the words of his official biographer Forrest 
C. Pogue, "airborne units were being frittered away merely as support troops instead of 
being used decisively in an assault."23  To prevent further misuse of airborne forces, 
Ridgway submitted a set of written principles, tactics and procedures that theater 
commanders should follow when considering the employment of airborne forces.24  
Ridgway's principles were very similar to the ones outlined in Training Circular No. 113.   
In addition to these principles, there were also items similar to tactics and 
procedures employed only during the Nadzab operation.  One of these items was the use 
of combat aircraft for resupply if transport planes were unavailable or unable to perform 
such missions.  Another item was the use of air support in the form of air bombardment, 
smoke and diversionary attacks to support the airborne operation.25 
Training Circular No. 113 had a significant impact on future airborne operations as 
well as the development of doctrine for large-scale airborne operations.  This training 
circular became the reference for subsequent airborne operations during the war.  As the 
airborne operations grew larger in scale and complexity, the employment principles 
remained valid.  Large portions of the training circular appeared verbatim in the War 
Department Field Manual 71-30, Employment of Airborne Forces, dated July 3, 1947.  
This field manual replaced War Department Field Manual 31-30, Tactics and Techniques 
of Air-Borne Troops, dated May 20, 1942, which was the basic doctrine for airborne 
operations during the war.      
Training Circular No. 113 not only had an impact on the development of airborne 
doctrine, but it also had an impact on the development on troop carrier aviation doctrine.  
On January 31, 1944, by direction of Chief of the AAF General Arnold, the AAF Board 
initiated a project to prepare a field manual on the tactics and techniques of troop carrier 
operations.   “It is desired that this project serve to consolidate the loose ends of Troop 
Carrier aviation into a compact manual which will serve as a useful guide and to clarify 
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many of the misunderstandings on this type of aviation,” said the Board.26  The primary 
reference for this project was Training Circular No. 113.  The directive stated that the 
Nadzab airborne operation was a useful source of information for the project. 
 The purpose of the proposed manual was to present a complete picture of troop 
carrier operations in its various phases with special emphasis on training of crews and 
units, operations, communications, navigation aids, and employment of gliders.  In 
addition, there was special emphasis on the close coordination that must exist between 
troop carrier and airborne forces when planning and conducting operations.  The directive 
also underscored that close coordination between the Troop Carrier Command and the 
Airborne Command was necessary in the development of the troop carrier manual so that 
there would be no conflict in doctrine since the Airborne Command was in the process of 
updating their manual on airborne operations, War Department Field Manual 31-30, 
Tactics and Techniques of Air-Borne Troops.27 
 On January 18, 1946, Arnold approved the AAF Board's tactics and techniques of 
troop carrier aviation project.  Large portions of Training Circular No. 113 appeared 
verbatim in this report as well.  The project's recommendations included the text for a field 
manual on troop carrier aviation operations.  The text later appeared as War Department 
Field Manual 1-30, Tactical Doctrine of Troop Carrier Aviation, dated August 12, 1947.  
This manual was the first doctrinal manual on troop carrier operations in support of 
airborne operations.28 
Not a direct result of the Swing Board, but a follow-on action, was the publication 
of AGF's memorandum, "Joint Training of Airborne and Troop Carrier Units," dated 
November 2, 1943.  This memorandum contained the newly developed program of 
instruction for combined airborne-troop carrier training for parachute battalions, parachute 
regiments and airborne divisions.  The War Department had directed this training in its 
memorandum for "Joint Training of Airborne and Troop Carrier Units," issued on October 
9.  The training plan had three phases: small unit training, large unit training and divisional 
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training.  Each phase built upon the previous phase.  The memorandum laid out the tasks, 
conditions and standards for each phase of the training.29 
The memorandum specified the requirements an airborne division must satisfy 
before the Army Ground Forces certified the unit as combat ready.  Each airborne division 
must satisfactorily complete a combined maneuver of the following scope: 
 
a. Duration -- approximately five days. 
b. Employ at least four departure air bases. 
c. Objective area to be reached by circuitous route of approximately 300 miles. 
d. At least one-half of the landings and assembly of units to be made at night. 
e. The maneuver will be planned so that contact with friendly ground forces will 
not be made prior to D plus 4. 
f. Re-supply and evacuation by air and/or air landing during period D to D plus 
4.30 
 
 
The giant test maneuver that Marshall ordered used these standards to evaluate the 
feasibility of large-scale airborne operations and the ability to command and control the 
airborne division.  Swing's 11th Airborne Division was the first unit to conduct the test. 
Stimson was highly interested in the success of the airborne concept.  Just before 
the test maneuver, he visited Swing and the 11th Airborne Division during a training 
exercise at Camp Mackall.  On November 23, 1943, Stimson watched the division stage a 
nighttime parachute and glider, infantry and artillery, demonstration that was a huge 
success. The 11th Airborne Division impressed the secretary of war.  In a note several 
days later to Swing, he wrote, "The Airborne Infantry Division will play a great part in our 
future successes, and I know that the 11th Airborne Division will render outstanding 
service to our country on some not too far distant D Day."31  He did not know how true that 
he would be. 
 The special test maneuver that Marshall ordered for the 11th Airborne Division took 
place during the first week of December 1943.  The objective of the division was to 
capture the Knollwood Airport in North Carolina; thereafter, this exercise became known 
as the Knollwood Maneuvers.  The senior evaluator for the exercise was none other than 
McNair, the sharpest critic of the airborne division concept.  He directed the 11th Airborne 
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Division to conduct the maneuver according to Training Circular No. 113 and evaluated it 
according to his headquarters' memorandum "Joint Training of Airborne and Troop Carrier 
Units," of  November 2, 1943.32 
 Across five departure airfields on December 6, the 11th Airborne Division loaded its 
airplanes and gliders.  The division and troop carrier staff synchronized the takeoffs from 
each of the airports so that each serial joined the column in its proper place in line as the 
entire division became airborne.  The column headed east over the North Carolina 
shoreline, out over the Atlantic Ocean, turned north and then back west to the designated 
drop and landing zones.  Golf courses around Pinehurst and Southern Pines, open fields 
outside towns, and areas adjacent to Knollwood Airport were the drop and landing zones 
for the maneuver.33  
 Almost all the jumpers and gliders hit the proper drop and landing zones.  In a few 
hours, the division assembled and seized its assault objectives.  Before dawn, the 
Knollwood Airport was in the hands of the 11th Airborne Division.  For the next five days, 
the division received a steady flow of troop carrier aircraft loaded with all the supplies.  It 
successfully waged simulated combat against the defenders from the 17th Airborne 
Division over the sand hills of North Carolina near Knollwood.  By the evening of the sixth 
day, McNair declared the Knollwood Maneuvers over.  The maneuver was a huge 
success for the 11th Airborne Division and the airborne concept.34 
The week after the maneuver, McNair rendered his verdict on the Knollwood 
Maneuvers to Swing.  McNair wrote:   
 
I congratulate you on the splendid performance of your division in the Knollwood 
Maneuver.  After the airborne operations in Africa and Sicily, my staff and I had 
become convinced of the impracticality of handling large airborne units.  I was 
prepared to recommend to the War Department that airborne divisions be 
abandoned in our scheme or organization and that airborne effort be restricted to 
parachute units of battalion size or smaller.  The successful performance of your 
division has convinced me that we were wrong, and I shall now recommend that 
we continue our present schedule of activating, training, and committing airborne 
divisions.35 
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Swing's paratroopers convinced the top army leaders that airborne divisions were 
tactically sound, but it was the 503d PIR’s jump at Nadzab that nullified the doubts after 
Sicily that set the stage for the Knollwood Maneuvers.  The Knollwood Maneuvers 
breathed new life into the nearly dead airborne division concept.   
Also in attendance to watch the maneuvers was Ridgway.  Afterward, he flew back 
to Ireland to rejoin his paratroopers already there preparing for their next mission.  The 
invasion of Nazi-held Europe was to begin in just over four months.  The vast Allied 
assault into Normandy began with three airborne divisions -- the American 82d and 101st 
and one British.  The large-scale American parachute drops on D-Day proved that 
McNair’s decision to save the airborne division had been a wise one. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
"This operation by the 503d was probably the classic text-book airborne 
operation of World War II.  What the 503d did was a vertical envelopment 
by parachute assault, seizing and then defending an airhead at Nadzab."1
 
-- Lieutenant General (Ret.) John J. Tolson    
 
 After the disastrous results of the airborne operations at Sicily, the future of the 
airborne was in question.  Many senior military leaders believed that the airborne division 
was not a sound concept.  The skeptics argued that it was too large of an organization for 
a commander to regain control and operate the scattered forces as a functional unit after 
a parachute drop.  Despite the initial failures of regimental-size airborne operations, the 
advocates of vertical envelopment insisted that a division-size structure with the capability 
of conducting large-scale offensive combat operations was necessary to support the 
planned invasion of Europe as well as Japanese-held territories in the Pacific Theater. 
 The initial string of failures was not different from any other development of a new 
military concept.  Only through a series of trials and errors did the doctrine, training and 
employment principles develop to properly employ the new concept.  The 503d PIR's 
success at Nadzab was a powerful assertion of the possibilities of large-scale airborne 
operations.  The fortuitous timing of this operation coincided with the Swing Board, which 
was studying the lessons learned from Sicily and recommending the necessary changes 
to employ this new concept effectively.   
 In a letter to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, retired Lieutenant General 
John J. Tolson stated that the 503d PIRs airborne operation at Nadzab "was probably the 
classic text-book airborne operation of World War II."2  Tolson knew a few things about 
airborne operations, since he was the first American paratrooper to jump into combat as 
the commander of Third Battalion.  He also went on to command the 1st Cavalry Division 
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(Air Mobile) during Vietnam from March 1967 to August 1968 and the XVIII Airborne 
Corps from August 1968 to March 1971. 
 What Tolson did not say was that the textbook for that size operation had not been 
written at the time the parachute drop occurred.  Most of the doctrine for large-scale 
airborne operations did not come out until the publication of Training Circular No. 113 as a 
result of the Swing Board.  This recommendation, as well as the many other 
recommendations that the Swing Board made, established the necessary principles to 
employ an airborne division effectively.  The success of the 11th Airborne Division in the 
Knollwood Maneuvers ended the debate.  The airborne division concept, tried and tested, 
proved to be credible, workable and functional. 
 The commander of Second Battalion, 503d PIR for Nadzab was retired Brigadier 
General George M. Jones.  In a letter to one of his paratroopers writing a regimental 
history, Jones summed up the accomplishments of his regiment at Nadzab.  “When the 
503d put all three battalions on their jump target within 4-1/2 minutes and, of course, with 
MacArthur looking on with members of his staff from an observation plane, it was bound to 
affect the thinking of the people in the War Department that said paratrooping was not a 
feasible means of entering troops into combat,” he wrote.  “We will never know, but in my 
opinion, the Jump saved the Airborne effort.”3  Shortly after the Nadzab parachute drop, 
Jones became the commander of the 503d PIR and commanded the regiment for the 
remainder of the World War II.  The regiment made its next jump on the Island of 
Noemfoor in July 1944, but the one that made the 503d PIR famous was the airborne 
assault onto Corregidor on February 16, 1945.  After that jump, the regiment became 
famous for its seizure of the "The Rock." 
 In spite of the fame from Corregidor, the 503d PIR's parachute drop at Nadzab had 
the greatest impact on the development of the airborne concept.   This airborne operation 
achieved more than just its tactical objectives.  It was the first unqualified successful 
American parachute drop of World War II and was decisive in allowing the advocates of 
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vertical envelopment make to make a convincing case for the soundness of the airborne 
concept, as well as that of the airborne division. 
 
 
Figure 13.  503d Parachute Infantry Regiment Patch
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APPENDIX A 
HISTORY OF THE 503D PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT 
 
On August 22, 1941, the War Department activated the 503d Parachute Battalion 
under the command of Major Robert Sink, who was a member of the 501st Parachute 
Battalion, the first parachute battalion, formed in September 1940 from the original Test 
Platoon. 1  On August 29, 1940, the Test Platoon had completed its fifth and final 
qualifying jump for a prestigious audience.  The two most notable personnel present 
were the Secretary of War Honorable Henry L. Stimson and Chief of Staff of the Army 
General George C. Marshall.  Fortunately for the airborne concept, the Test Platoon 
made a favorable impression on both of them that they did not quickly forget.   The 
members of the Test Platoon formed the cadre of the 501st Parachute Battalion and 
many later became members of the 503d PIR when the 501st Parachute Battalion 
became the Second Battalion, 503d PIR in November 1942.2  
The executive officer for the 503d Parachute Battalion was one of the most 
famous paratroopers of World War II, then Major James M. Gavin who later became the 
commander of the 505th PIR at Sicily, Assistant 82d Airborne Division Commander at 
Normandy, and 82d Airborne Division Commander in Operation MARKET-GARDEN.  
The operations officer was Captain Joseph Lawrie, who later commanded the First 
Battalion, 503d PIR and was the executive officer for the regiment in the Pacific.3
Sink had formed the battalion at Fort Benning, Georgia from thousands of 
volunteers.  He selected based solely on merit only 341 enlisted men and 37 officers.   
On October 3, 1941, the battalion made its fifth qualifying jump and then moved onto 
other advanced infantry training under the direction of Colonel Lee's Provisional 
Parachute Group.  Soon the battalion reached its authorized strength of 456 enlisted 
men by tapping into the first group of selective service personnel at Camp Roberts, 
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California.  These draftees volunteered for paratrooper training in October 1941.  Once 
they completed jump training, they became a part of Company A, 503d Parachute 
Battalion.4  
On October 5 the War Department activated the next parachute battalion, the 
504th Parachute Battalion under the command of Major Richard Chase, who was also a 
member of the 501st Parachute Battalion and previously an executive officer of the 503d 
Parachute Battalion.  Unlike the other three previous parachute battalions, this unit 
entered and left jump school as a unit.  The battalion planned to make its final qualifying 
jump on December 15.  With the outbreak of war on December 7, there were not enough 
airplanes available and the battalion did not make its final jump until January 26, 1942.5
Just after the 504th Parachute Battalion completed basic airborne training, the 
503d and 504th Parachute Battalions moved to Fort Bragg because of the crowded 
conditions at Fort Benning and the formation of the Airborne Command at Fort Bragg.  
On March 2 with the peacetime allocations for army troop strengths lifted, the War 
Department ordered the formation of four parachute regiments from the existing 
parachute battalions.  Uniting the 503d and 504th Parachute Battalions, the two units 
formed the 503d PIR.  The 503rd Parachute Battalion became the First Battalion and the 
504th Parachute Battalion became the Second Battalion of the 503d PIR.  The first 
commander of the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel William M. Miley, who was then 
commanding of the first parachute battalion, 501st Parachute Battalion, at Fort Kobbe, 
Panama.6   
On May 20, less than three months after the regiment formed, the War 
Department ordered Miley to provide a parachute battalion for duty in Europe.  He 
released the Second Battalion (originally the 504th Parachute Battalion), which was later 
renamed the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and gained the distinction of being the 
first American unit to jump in combat during Operation TORCH in North Africa.7
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In March 1942, the 82d Infantry Division reactivated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana 
under the direction of Major General Omar Bradley.  Brigadier General Matthew B. 
Ridgway, the Assistant Division Commander, replaced General Bradley as the 
commander in June.  Miley then departed the 503d PIR to be the Assistant Division 
Commander for the newly redesignated 82d Airborne Division.8  Sink, then executive 
officer for the 503d PIR, became the commander of the regiment on July 20.  His new 
executive officer was Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Kinsler, who, like Sink, was a 
member of the original 501st Parachute Battalion at Fort Benning.  Kinsler had just 
returned to Fort Bragg from his command of the 501st Parachute Battalion that was in 
Panama.  When Kinsler departed from Panama, he relinquished command to his 
executive officer, Major George M. Jones.9
Sink did not command the 503d PIR very long.  Shortly after taking command, he 
left to take charge of the newly activated 506th PIR at Camp Toccoa, Georgia.  This 
regiment later became part of the 101st Airborne Division.  Kinsler moved up to be the 
next commander of the 503d PIR.10  
With the departure of Second Battalion for Europe, the 503d PIR had only one 
remaining battalion at Fort Bragg.  On June 4, the War Department activated the Third 
Battalion of the 503d PIR.  Just before the Second Battalion departed for Europe, Miley 
reassigned the executive officer, Major John J. Tolson III, to form the newly authorized 
Third Battalion of the 503d PIR.  The paratroopers who formed the newly activated unit 
came from the cadre of the 502d Parachute Battalion who were still at Fort Benning.   
The Headquarters Company of the 502d became the Headquarters of Third Battalion, 
503d PIR.  Company A, B and C of the 502d Parachute Battalion became Company G, H 
and I, Third Battalion, 503d PIR respectively.11   
In October 1942, the War Department secretly ordered the 503d PIR to the Pacific 
Theater.  On October 10, the 503d PIR completed loading all the men and equipment on 
trains under the direction of Tolson.  Kinsler temporarily transferred Tolson, Third 
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Battalion Commander, to job of regimental executive officer and acting commander of 
the regiment for the move when he departed early for Australia to prepare for his unit's 
arrival.12
                                            
1 Guthrie, Three Winds of Death, pp. 12-16. 
 
2 Devlin, Paratrooper!, pp. 71-77. 
 
3 Guthrie, Three Winds of Death, p. 16. 
4 Ibid., p. 13. 
5 Ibid., pp. 13-16. 
6 Ibid., p. 18. 
7 Ibid., p. 20. 
8 Blair, Ridgway's Paratroopers, pp. 18-32. 
 
9 Guthrie, Three Winds of Death, pp. 20-22. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Devlin, Paratrooper!, p. 256. 
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APPENDIX B 
GENERAL KENNEY LETTER TO GENERAL ARNOLD,  
DATED SEPTEMBER 7, 1943 
You already know by this time the news of the preliminary moves to take out Lae, 
but I will tell you about the show on the 5th September, when we took Nadzab with 1700 
paratroops and with General MacArthur in a B-17 over the area watching the show and 
jumping up and down like a kid.  I was flying number two in the same flight with him and 
the operation really was a magnificent spectacle.  I truly don't believe that another air 
force in the world today could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did. 
Three hundred and two airplanes in all, taking off from eight different fields in the 
Moresby and Dobodura areas, made a rendezvous right on the nose over Marilinan, 
flying through clouds, passes in the mountains, and over the top.  Not a single squadron 
did any circling or stalling around but all slid into place like clockwork and proceeded on 
the final flight down the Watut Valley, turned to the right down the Markham, and went 
directly to the target.  Going north down the valley of the Watut from Marilinan, this was 
the picture: Heading the parade at one thousand feet were six squadrons of B-25 
strafers, with the eight .50-caliber guns in the nose and sixty frag bombs in each bomb 
bay; immediately behind and about five hundred feet above were six A-20s, flying in 
pairs-three pairs abreast-to lay smoke as the last frag bomb exploded.  At about two 
thousand feet and directly behind the A-20s came ninety-six C-47s carrying paratroops, 
supplies, and some artillery.  The C-47s flew in three columns of three-plane elements, 
each column carrying a battalion set up for a particular battalion dropping ground.  On 
each side along the column of transports and about one thousand feet above them were 
the close-cover fighters. Another group of fighters sat at seven thousand feet and, up in 
the sun, staggered from fifteen to twenty thousand, was still another group.  Following 
the transports came five B-17s, racks loaded with 300-pound packages with parachutes, 
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to be dropped to the paratroopers on call by panel signals as they needed them.  This 
mobile supply unit stayed over Nadzab practically all day serving the paratroops below, 
dropping a total of fifteen tons of supplies in this manner.  Following the echelon to the 
right and just behind the five supply B-17s was a group of twenty-four B-24s and four B-
17s, which left the column just before the junction of the Watut and the Markham to take 
out the Jap defensive position at Heath's Plantation, about halfway between Nadzab and 
Lae.  Five weather ships were used prior to and during the show along the route and 
over the passes, to keep the units straight on weather to be encountered during their 
flights to the rendezvous.  The brass-hat flight of three B-17s above the center of the 
transport column completed the set-up.  
The strafers checked in on the target at exactly the time set, just prior to take-off. 
They strafed and frag-bombed the whole area in which the jumps were to be made, and 
then as the last bombs exploded the smoke layers went to work.  As the streams of 
smoke were built up, the three columns of transports slid into place and in one minute 
and ten seconds from the time the first parachute opened the last of 1700 paratroopers 
had dropped.  During the operation, including the bombing of Heath's, a total on ninety-
two tons of high-explosive bombs was dropped, thirty-two tons of fragmentation bombs 
and 42,580 rounds of caliber .50 and 5180 rounds of caliber .30 ammunition were 
expended.  At the same time nine B-25s and sixteen P-38s attacked the Jap refueling 
airdrome at Cape Gloucester.  One medium bomber and one fighter on the ground were 
burned and three medium bombers and one fighter destroyed in combat.  Two ack-ack 
positions were put out of action and several supply and fuel dumps set on fire.  Between 
five and a half and six tons of parafrags were dropped and 19,000 rounds of caliber .50 
ammunition fired. Simultaneously also, ten Beauforts, five A-20S, and seven P-40s from 
the R.A.A.F. put the Jap refueling field at Gasmata out of action. No air interception was 
made by the Japs on any of the three missions.  Our only losses were two Beauforts 
shot down by ack-ack at Gasmata. 
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